The Presidential Years 329
intellectuals but also among the workers and the young. Self-critically, he rec-
ognized that he had avoided dealing with the issue in the past, convinced that
the time was not ripe for overcoming such wrongs, but he added that “it is
clear that I made a mistake in ignoring the problem.”^341 During the first half of
1966, Ranković seemed still steadfast, in spite of the menacing storm on the
horizon. At the end of March Tito sent him to the Soviet Union at the helm
of a delegation that took part in the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU.
“Comrade Marko,” who in 1964 had approved close collaboration between the
secret services of the two countries, was received cordially and treated like a head
of state. During a dinner attended by Kremlin leadership, one of the members
of the Yugoslav delegation toasted “the future young president of the Socialist
Federative Republic.”^342 It was even said that Ranković had discussed Tito’s
physical decline with the Soviets, which he later denied.^343 In mid-May he
visited Poland as a guest of the local workers’ party. On that occasion there were
no lack of rumors: it was said that in Warsaw he met secretly with Suslov, the
éminence grise of the CPSU, which seemed to announce a coup d’état.^344 Tito,
who was informed in detail, adopted a frosty attitude toward him. When dur-
ing a reception a group of young people started to sing a song about the heroic
deeds of “Comrade Marko,” somebody asked him: “Comrade Tito, how it is
possible that this is sung?” The marshal did not answer, but left immediately.^345
The PlotTito’s minion, Ivan Krajačić (Stevo), the prewar agent of the NKVD and Soviet
“executioner,” played an important role in the plot organized against Ranković.^346
He had a special position at the court because of his past, but also because
the marshal feared or was in debt to him for reasons that were unclear. (The
story goes that in 1948 Krajačić was tasked by Stalin to kill Tito. Tito, alerted by
West German intelligence, invited him on a lonely drive and, during a stop,
challenged him to shoot. Comrade Stevo did not.)^347 Krajačić always had the
final say about Tito’s security and could behave in Tito’s presence with com-
plete liberty, even raising his voice, which others were obviously not allowed
to do.^348 In addition to Stevo, Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs Milan
Mišković and his brother Ivan, chief of military intelligence, were also part of
the plot. Later, Ranković remembered that Krajačić, the Croatian “Rasputin,”
invited him several times “to go hunting, where an accident could happen.”^349
But since “Comrade Marko” always prudently declined such invitations, they
had to get rid of him in a different way. It was not clear until the very end,
however, as Kardelj confessed to his friends, whether Tito would support the
liberal or the conservative faction, and who would be put in the dock: him or
Ranković.^350