The Presidential Years 333
the radio and TV stations in mid-June and mobilizing the police. In doing so,
they used mostly Slovenes and Croats, since the Serbs were considered unreli-
able.^370 The situation was so tense that the General Staff organized Tito’s secret
departure from Belgrade because, according to confidential information, there
was a danger of his being kidnapped. (According to another version, he was
escorted to Brioni by Krajačić in his Mercedes along back roads.)^371 The archi-
pelago, which in summer was full of select guests, was on that occasion nearly
empty because, apart from army and police units, there were only members of
the CC. The tension of the time is well expressed by Krajačić’s letter to Tito on
1 July 1966. Normally his handwriting was quite regular, but on that occasion he
wrote nervously, so that some words are illegible. From the context it is clear,
however, that Comrade Stevo had been in touch with Bakarić and Mišković,
and that the latter was ready “to do everything necessary to clarify the situation,
because those who surround you are treacherous, so we need to solve this.”^372
When they disembarked at Brioni, the members of the CC were given the
material related to the discussion for the following day. Most of it was pub-
lished later, but not the so-called “documentation,” which was supposed to be
returned and which contained information on the intercepted communica-
tions and the names of those involved.^373 Ranković, the last one to learn of the
gravity of his position, only became aware of it late at night when he received
the papers prepared for the discussion. The file contained new accusations
never before mentioned. He was so shaken that he felt sick. It was later ascer-
tained that he had suffered a mild stroke, about which the doctor who had been
called informed no one, not even the patient himself.^374
At the session of the Fourth Plenum, Tito started with self-criticism for not
having dealt with the accumulated problems before, as he had been aware of
them since March 1962. He accused Ranković and his deputy, Stefanović, of
having tolerated the illegal activity of the UDBA group, which had tried to
seize power and hinder the development of the self-managed democracy. To
this end, he had been spied on and manipulated, and been given partial or even
false information. As he described it: “This is a sectarian struggle for power,
a factious one.”^375
During the turbulent CC session, which lasted several hours, Ranković was
physically destroyed, feverish, and with a strong pain in his chest. As one of
those present relates, he appeared more like a coatrack than a living man.^376 He
tried, however, to address the floor immediately after Tito and Crvenkovski. At
first he read a written declaration which contained no reply to the accusations
against him. Although he admitted that the UDBA methods had been “dirty,”
he did not recognize them as his own, since for some time he had not led the
service directly. He denied being a Serb nationalist but was interrupted by