The Presidential Years 361
autonomy and full transparency in their relations with the central government,
especially with regard to economics. “The maspok [masovni pokret; mass move-
ment],” said Miko Tripalo, “tried to establish new democratic relations between
the party and the working class, the party and the vast strata of citizens, between
thoughtful action and spontaneous movement, but also the popular supervision
of the party and its functionaries.”^530
Tito favored the rise to power of the new personalities. Under pressure from
Belgrade government circles, the marshal hoped to carry out the so-called
“federalization of the federation” with the help of the Croats, and to transform
Yugoslavia into a community of more autonomous entities, weakening the
Serbs and assuring for himself the role of arbiter-for-life.^531 He was convinced
that in Serbia they plotted against him, and with typical senile paranoia often
lamented that he was without any support. In reality, he could count on Gen-
eral Ljubičić, chief of the army, on the secretary for internal affairs, Radovan
Stijačić, and on General Ivan Mišković, chief of military intelligence. There
was also the Croat “young guard.” Tito nurtured a great sympathy for Miko
Tripalo and Pero Pirker, another member of the Zagreb power group. He was
attracted by their joyful and youthful company, and their irreverent kind of fun
that defied social convention, including dirty jokes that nobody else would dare
to tell in his presence. Later he said that he had considered the possibility of
making Tripalo his heir.^532
The Croat liberals could count on the support of Vladimir Bakarić, who
since the thirties had been one of Tito’s most influential collaborators and con-
fidants. After 1945, but especially after the fall of Hebrang, he became a sort
of viceroy in Croatia, loyally carrying out instructions from Belgrade. His fol-
lowers affirmed, half-seriously, that it was always prudent to observe which
direction Bakarić went, because he never chose the wrong track. Bakarić did
not govern with an iron fist, and never betrayed his bourgeois origins, but tried
to be courteous in his relations with people. At the start of their collaboration,
Savka Dabčević-Kučar noted in her diary that, at the seat of the CC, Bakarić
was the only one who used to knock on the door before entering.^533
After masterminding Ranković’s fall, Bakarić joined the young leaders who
rose to power in Croatia, watching their backs, but without taking any risks
until the end of 1969. On 13 December of that year, he gave a speech to a party
group, in which he refuted the accusations about the revival of Croat national-
ism coming from Belgrade. The first to speak was a Dalmatian, Miloš Žanko,
vice-president of the Federal Assembly and member of the Croat CC who, in
February 1969, began crying wolf, evidently in concert with conser vative groups
that wanted to create a political crisis in Croatia.^534 Between 17 and 23 Novem-
ber, Borba published a series of his articles under the provocative title “In this