The Presidential Years 373
Richard Nixon in YugoslaviaAfter the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Tito’s attempts to get confirmation from
the Soviets regarding Khrushchev’s assurances that Yugoslavia had a right to its
independence and to follow an autonomous path to socialism remained fruitless
for a long time. During Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s visit to Belgrade
in September 1969, and Mitja Ribičič’s visit to Moscow in July 1970, Soviet
leaders were not willing to publicly declare that the “Brezhnev doctrine” about
limited sovereignty did not also refer to the Yugoslavs.^598 As Latinka Perović
writes, quoting recent Russian research, after the intervention of the Warsaw
Pact in Prague, the Soviet Union could not allow the success of economic re-
form in Yugoslavia. This would signify that socialism with a human face was
possible, though the Soviets rejected any version of socialism that differed from
their own.^599 The danger of a Muscovite intervention was ever present. In this
situation, the marshal was obliged to follow a double political line: on one side,
he attempted to hang on to the characteristic features of the Soviet model,
based on the guiding role of the LCY (which preserved his power), on the
other, he tried to bring to bear the international prestige he had earned in his
relations with Moscow. After the deaths of Nehru and Nasser, the marshal was
the only founding father of the Non-Aligned Movement left, and he felt that
it was his duty to cultivate and strengthen it, not least because it assured him a
prominent role on the international stage and guaranteed a certain measure of
security to his country. Between 26 January and 27 February, he visited Tanza-
nia, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Egypt, and Libya. The result of this tour
was the Third Conference of the Non-Aligned the following September in
Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, which Tito had spent much time planning to
give new impetus to the movement; he even tried to convince French president
Charles de Gaulle to attend.^600 After the events in Prague, the movement faced
a moment of grave crisis, since Tito’s Arab friends did not share his urgency to
condemn the intervention of the Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia and
ignored his hint that a third non-aligned summit be convened to consider the
problem. In Lusaka, however, the marshal succeeded in resolving the disagree-
ments of the previous years, laying the foundations for an executive body capa-
ble of assuring constant, coordinated, and efficient activity for the non-aligned.
At least temporarily, the movement experienced a golden period, and became
more present and influential in the international arena.^601
At the same time, Tito succeeded in renewing contact with China, even
though over the previous ten years Beijing had not missed a chance to argue
with the “Yugoslav arch-reactionaries.” In May 1968, the Chinese press hurled
invectives at Tito because of his adverse opinion of their “cultural revolution.”^602
After the outburst ebbed, however, diplomatic relations were resumed thanks