The Later Years 405
careful of hard currency and too insensitive of the consequences of the exodus
of so many young and capable people.”^65
In this he was supported by Stane Dolanc, who stressed in an interview on
New Year’s Eve 1973 that in some Western European countries the hostile pro-
paganda against Yugoslavia was directed against progressive forces in general,
even in their own backyards. Although influenced by tense relations with Italy
and Austria because of the border question between Zones A and B of the for-
mer Free Territory of Trieste (still not recognized by Rome), and because of the
Slovenian minority in Carinthia, these reflections were above all aimed at cre-
ating a feeling of public alarm to be used as a safety valve that would relieve the
dissatisfaction of the popular masses regarding the difficult domestic situation.^66
When a new war between the Arabs and the Israelis started on 8 October
1973, Tito had no doubts about with whom to side: he immediately promised
“all-round” support to the Arabs to shore up his waning authority in the non-
aligned movement. While the fight was going on, Yugoslav journalists were
given the directive to write “as if we were at war with Israel.” They did so
against their feelings.^67 The marshal granted fly-over rights for the Soviet air-
lift supplying arms to Egyptian and Syrian units and, when these were heav-
ily defeated, he went so far as to suggest to Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s successor,
that he bomb Tel Aviv. This advice, intercepted by American intelligence,
provoked a wave of indignation in Washington. The United States accused
Tito of having decisively contributed to the outbreak of hostilities in the Mid-
dle East and definitively abandoned the hope of using him as a mediator in
that region. The relations between Belgrade and Washington deteriorated so
much that, for a certain period, they were nearly interrupted altogether. Henry
Kissinger broke off contacts with the Yugoslav ambassador and the following
autumn refused to receive the Yugoslav foreign secretary during his stay in New
York for the UN General Assembly.^68 Nahum Goldmann, founder of the Jew-
ish World Congress, took a different attitude; he invited his old friend Tito
to resume his mediation between the warring parties. The marshal did so, but
without success.^69
The cooling of relations between Belgrade and Washington was welcomed
by Yugoslav military chiefs who believed that the “aggressive and imperialist
powers were offensive everywhere in the world: first in Vietnam and Cambo-
dia, then in Chile, Panama, Puerto Rico and in Middle East. This offensive,
aimed at gaining new positions, went very far—“to the limits of a Third World
Wa r. ”^70 In the government and in economic and intellectual circles, by con-
trast, Tito’s pro-Arab policy caused bewilderment. It was widely said that he
had sacrificed the interest of the country to his ambition to play an important
role on the world stage. He was heavily criticized—but obviously without any