46 The Young Broz
V. P. Kolarov wrote a report proposing to confirm the provisional leadership
of the CPY, to restore financial help, and to order the magazine Rundschau not
to publish anything without Walter’s permission (this was clearly aimed at the
“factions” in Paris and in Yugoslavia).^213 In spite of this favorable judgment,
on 30 December he had a stormy discussion with Dimitrov, who took a critical
view of the chaotic internal situation of the CPY, saying: “Your work is com-
pletely meaningless, it just won’t do.”^214 Since the secretary general had branded
the leading Yugoslav communists as “sectarians,” Broz included, in Dimitrov’s
opinion no permanent party leadership was possible at the moment, only a
provisional one. Even so, at the end of this diatribe he charged Walter with
carrying out the “final instructions” he had given: “The leadership (provisional)
inside the country. A conference. Installment of a stable leadership. In Paris: a
man for communications.”^215
But he did something more. Some days later, on 5 January 1939, he received
Walter again, informing him that he had been nominated secretary general of
the CC CPY, with the task of completely changing the old party structures.
Dimitrov cautioned him: “You are the only one left. This is your last chance.
Either you will be able to restore order or, as in Poland, everything will be dis-
banded. Everyone has been arrested. People for whom I would have put my
hand in the fire.”^216 In a note about this meeting, so decisive for his future, Broz
modestly affirms that he was utterly surprised, because his ambitions were not
that of being the leader of the party; he was mostly moved by the desire to save
it from dissolution and transform it into a compact and revolutionary organism
headed by a strong collective. Nevertheless, he accepted Dimitrov’s nomina-
tion, promising: “We will clean the filth.”^217 Dimitrov answered with a grimace:
“Don’t boast too soon.”^218
That same day, the IKKI secretariat also met and gave Walter a series of
instructions on how to restructure the party and strengthen it politically. It
recommended closing the ranks against the Fascist menace, uniting all demo-
cratic forces in a Popular Front, and above all keeping in mind the trade unions
so as to have contact with the workers, the most important component of
socialist life. This resolution was to serve as an outline for a letter that Broz
would write and send to all members of the CPY.^219 However, there were still
conflicting opinions about him. This is revealed in a note Manuilskii sent to
Dimitrov two days later, on 7 January 1939, proposing that Walter be removed
from the leadership of the party and given a “lower post” in consideration of the
fact that he was at least partially responsible for the failed expedition of volun-
teers two years earlier.^220 His enemies in the Cadre Department acted immedi-
ately: a new commission was instituted to investigate the incident once more.
Broz tried to blame it on adverse meteorological conditions, claiming that a