56 World War Two and the Partisan Struggle
instructions that “Bolshevik vigilance and discipline” was to be strengthened.^29
In accordance with this, Broz was especially active in his attempts to extirpate
“the malign tumor of our party” in Dalmatia, where “sectarian” elements were
numerous. He uncompromisingly denounced them, urging his followers to
boycott the culprits and not even greet them in the street.^30
The agreement, reached in August 1939 by the new prime minister of the
royal government, Dragiša Cvetković, with the leader of the Croat Peasant
Party, Vlatko Maček, recognizing an autonomous Croatia within the boun-
daries of Yugoslavia, would probably have been approved by the communists
earlier. In light of the new orthodoxy, however, it was seen as a pact between
two bourgeoisies who were unable to solve the many national questions of the
country, not to mention the other scourges that tormented it. With regards to
foreign policy, Broz and his comrades feared that the new Cvetković-Maček
coalition government would be dependent on Great Britain and France, which
would allow them to involve Yugoslavia in their “imperialist war.” Alternatively,
as recommended by the Comintern, they favored an alliance between Yugo-
slavia and the Soviet Union, “which is the strongest enemy of the imperialist
war and a guaranty for the independence and security of small countries.”^31
That Stalin, in March 1940, had taken a big chunk of Finland’s territory and
was going to do the same with the Romanian province of Bessarabia did not
bother any of the faithful, nor did Hitler’s attack on Denmark and Norway.^32
In a report sent to Moscow at the end of May, Broz did not mention these
events. Instead he spoke at length of pro-English and pro-French sentiments,
which were “still unfortunately” widespread in Yugoslavia.^33
When the Wehrmacht defeated France in the first half of June 1940, Broz
argued that the moment had come to act in order to save Yugoslavia from the
war. His policy, with its slogan “for peace, bread, and freedom,” favored an alli-
ance of Balkan states that would seek shelter from the German menace under
the wings of the Soviet Union. The clandestine paper of the CPY, Proleter,
considered this possibility in an article, although it asserted that the Yugoslavs
would be wrong if they were counting solely on the help of the Red Army.
It would come to their rescue, if they helped themselves. How? Evidently,
with the creation of a popular government, as should be done according to
Lenin’s doctrine. The bourgeois revolution should be the first step to the pro-
letarian one.^34
The minutes of a session held on 15 September 1940 in the Comintern’s
archives tell an interesting story. On that occasion, the four main leaders of the
Executive Committee of the Comintern (or IKKI), Wilhelm Pieck, Palmiro
Togliatti, Klement Gottwald, and Dmitrii Manuilskii, discussed a verbal mes-
sage sent by Broz through his special envoy, Nikola Petrović, an engineer from