World War Two and the Partisan Struggle 77
of fomenting subversive activity against the “enemy overseas.”^144 The main
SOE headquarters in London was soon supported by a branch in Cairo that
covered the Balkans and the Near East. In order to be better informed, on 20
September 1941 the SOE sent a mission called Bullseye to Montenegro and
Serbia. It was led by Duane T. Hudson, a mining engineer from South Africa,
who knew Yugoslavia well having worked there before the war. According to
British documents, “Bill” Hudson was to head the Yugoslav resistance, which
was seen in London as an aid to the Soviets in their mortal fight against Hit-
ler.^145 Initially the Soviets were not opposed to this idea. In October 1941, their
envoy to the UK, Ivan M. Maisky, proposed to Anthony Eden, the British
foreign minister, that they coordinate their mutual assistance to the Yugoslav
rebels. Winston Churchill’s government agreed, hoping to unite the Chetniks
and the Partisans in a common front, but knowing full well that it could offer
them little aside from propaganda. It was the British who chose Mihailović as
the movement’s champion and created its myth.^146 The British press and the
BBC, followed by the American media, presented him as a shining example
for the whole of Europe, especially for countries under German occupation,
of “how to fight and to die for the fatherland.” In this context, it was of second-
ary importance that the heroic deeds so exalted had been done by Partisans,
and not by Chetniks.^147 No one paid much attention to the Partisans, not even
the Soviet government, which was incapable of sympathizing with a clearly
revolutionary movement at a time when German troops were approaching
Moscow. It is interesting to note that Radio Free Yugoslavia, organized by the
Comintern on 11 November 1941 in Ufa in the Urals, did not broadcast any
criticism of Mihailović, instead, as Tito indignantly noted, uncritically repeat-
ing news from the Western media, which turned him into a hero. According to
the British, the Serb guerrillas were blocking six German divisions and many
Italians in the Balkans. Through Kopinić in Moscow, Tito protested bitterly
against this “terrible lie,” but to no avail.^148
The hopes of the British to forge an alliance between A/H31 (Mihailović’s
code cipher in SOE files) and Tito, with the help of the Soviets, did not last
long.^149 Although Tito did not place much trust in the colonel or in his move-
ment, after taking Užice he was ready to share the bounty, handing over fifteen
thousand rifles and 5 million dinars.^150 In a conversation with Hudson, he con-
firmed that personally he did not nurture any grudge toward him, although he
thought that the majority of his followers were a bunch of unworthy men. The
negative traits of the Chetniks were, in his opinion, drunkenness, lack of disci-
pline, outlawry, and violence against women. All were contrary to the Partisan
ethics. He stressed, however, that he wanted to avoid any dispute with Mihailović
who, if not ready to collaborate, should at least not hinder the Partisans.^151