The Evolution of Operational Art. From Napoleon to the Present

(Tina Meador) #1
D. Romanovskii,Russko-Iaponskaia voina(Oranienbaum: Izdanie Ofitserskoi Strelkovoi
Shkoly,1910);A.A.Svechin,Takticheskie uroki russko-iaponskoi voiny(St. Petersburg:
Izdanie Ofitserskoi Strelkovoi Shkoly, 1912); A. A. Svechin, editor-in-chief,Voenno-
istoricheskii sbornik: Trudy Komissii po issledovaniiu opyta voiny 1914–1918,3vols.in4
books (Moscow: Tipografiia I. D. Sytina, 1919–21).


  1. Aleksandr A. Svechin,Strategy, trans. and ed. Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, MN: Eastview
    Press, 1992), 77. See also A. A. Svechin, ‘Izuchenie voennoi istorii’,Voina i revoliutsiia,
    no. 4 (April 1927), 49–66.

  2. A. A. Svechin,Istoriia voennogo iskusstva, 3 vols. (Moscow: Vyshei voennyi redatsion-
    nyi sovet, 1922).

  3. N. Varfolomeev, ‘Stategiya v akademicheskoy postanovke’,Voina i revoliutsiia, Novem-
    ber 1928, 84.

  4. Svechin,Strategy, 70–4.

  5. Ibid., 67.

  6. Ibid., 69.

  7. Ibid., 67.

  8. Ibid., 69.

  9. Ibid., 81–163.

  10. Ibid., 65–6. On this one-sided reading, see Jon Tetsuro Sumida,Decoding Clausewitz: A
    New Approach to ‘On War’(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 179–80.

  11. Ibid., 240. Svechin noted that ‘the study of Napoleon’s campaigns was reduced to the
    study of operational rather than the strategic art’.

  12. Svechin.Strategy, 246–7.

  13. B. M. Shaposhnikov,Mozg armii, vol. 1 (Moscow: Voennyi vestnik, 1927), 110–12.

  14. A. A. Svechin, ‘Gosudarstvennyi i frontovoi tyl’,Voina i revoliutsiia, no. 11 (November
    1928), 94–108.

  15. Bruce W. Menning, ‘Ni Mol’tke, ni Mekhen: Strategiia v Russko-Iaponskoi voine’, in
    O. P. Airapetov (ed.),Russko-Iaponskaia voina, 1904–1905: Vzgliad cherez stoletie
    (Moscow: Modest Kolerov i Izdael’stvo ‘Tri Kvadrata’, 2004), 15–37.

  16. Lennart Samuelson,Plans for Stalin’s War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-
    Economic Planning, 1925–1941(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 100–2.

  17. A. M. Vasilevskii and M. V. Zakharov, ‘Predislovie’, in B. M. Shaposhnikov,Vospomi-
    naniia – voenno-nauchnye trudy(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), 13–14.

  18. V. M. Ivanov,Marshal M. N. Tukhachevskii(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1990), 234–6.

  19. Ibid., 237–40.

  20. Ibid., 241–2.

  21. Lennart Samuelson,Soviet Defence Industry Planning: Tukhachevskii and Military-
    Industrial Mobilization, 1926–1937(Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm Institute of East
    European Economies, 1996), 118.

  22. Ibid., 124.

  23. M. N. Tukhachevsky, ‘Predislovie k knige Dhz. Fullera “Reformatsiia voiny”’, in M. N.
    Tukhachevsky,Izbrannye proizvedeniia, II, 152.

  24. Sally W. Stoecker,Forging Stalin’s Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Politics of
    Military Innovation(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 135–69.

  25. Ivanov,Marshal M. N. Tukhachevskii, 269–72, and M. A. Gareev,Obshchie-voiskovye
    ucheniia(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983), 93–9.

  26. In 1928, the main intelligence directorate of the Red Army Staff completed a major
    study on the prospects of future war with Poland and Romania as the main opponents
    supported by the British and French. Svechin and Tukhachevsky both took an active


92 The Evolution of Operational Art

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