- J. F. C. Fuller,The Foundations of the Science of War(London: Hutchinson, 1926), 14,
claims that Fuller himself was the author of the principles contained in the 1920Field
Service Regulations. - Azar Gat,Fascist and Liberal Visions of War: Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, and Other
Modernists(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 25. - The others were 1924 and 1929; see David French,Raising Churchill’s Army: The British
Army and the War against Germany, 1919–1945(Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), 13–34. - Quoted in David French, ‘Doctrine and Organization in the British Army, 1919–1932’,
Historical Journal, XLIV (2001), 500. - Ibid., 503–4.
- General Staff, War Office,Field Service Regulations, Vol. II: Operations. 1920. Provi-
sional(London: HMSO, 1920), 261. Emphasis added. - General Staff, War Office,Field Service Regulations, Vol. II: Operations—General. 1935
(London: HMSO, 1935), 176. - Frederick Maurice,British Strategy: A Study of the Applications of the Principles of War
(London: Constable, 1929), 51, 168. - Ibid., xv.
- Ibid., 3, 24, 27.
- Quoted in French,Raising Churchill’s Army, 22.
- Brian Holden Reid,J. F. C. Fuller: Military Thinker(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987),
111. - Fuller,Foundations of the Science of War, 17.
- J. F. C. Fuller,Lectures on F.S.R. II(London: Sifton Praed, 1931), xii, 1, 8; see also 34.
- J. F. C. Fuller,Lectures on F.S.R. III (Operations between Mechanized Forces)(London:
Sifton Praed, 1932), 11, 37, 44. - Ibid., 84, 89, 131.
- B. H. Liddell Hart,The Decisive Wars of History: A Study in Strategy(London: Bell,
1929), 19, 147–58. - Brian Holden Reid,Studies in British Military Thought: Debates with Fuller and
Liddell Hart(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 15–17; see also 74–90,
177–8, 182. - Ibid., 1.
- Victor Wallace Germains,The ‘Mechanization’ of War(London: Sifton Praed, 1927), xi.
- Ibid., xiv.
- J. P. Harris,Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces,
1903–1939(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), is the best guide on these
issues, and see esp. 278, 316–19. - French,Raising Churchill’s Army, 193–4.
- On the lack of doctrine especially early in the war, but even in 1944–5, see Timothy
Harrison Place,Military Training in the British Army, 1940–1944(London: Frank Cass,
2000), 9–16, 122–3, 137–51, 165–6, 169. - For criticism of Montgomery as an operational-level commander, see Williamson
Murray and Allan R. Millett,A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War(Cam-
bridge, MA: Belknap, 2000), 443, 456–7, 483. - Antony Beevor,Inside the British Army(London: Chatto and Windus, 1990), 161.
- Julian Lider,British Military Thought after World War II(Aldershot: Gower, 1985), 180;
see also Dierk Walter,Zwischen Dschungelkrieg und Atombombe. Britische Visionen vom
Krieg der Zukunft 1945–1971(Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2009).
134 The Evolution of Operational Art