- Peter Millar, ‘The Central Region Layer Cake’, in Mackenzie and Reid (eds.),The
British Army and the Operational Level of War, 31. - Ma ̈der,In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence, 104–28, makes the key points.
100.The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine. BR 1806(London: HMSO, 1995), 5. - Ibid., 71.
- Ibid., 73.
- Simpkin,Race to the Swift, 23.
104.UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions (JWP 0–01.1), M-3,
quoted in Ma ̈der,In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence, 89; see also Kiszely,The British
Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945; and Charles Grant, ‘The Use of History
in the Development of Contemporary Doctrine’, in John Gooch (ed.),The Origins of
Contemporary Doctrine(Strategic and Combat Studies Institute: The Occasional,
no. 30, 1997), 10–11.
105.British Defence Doctrine: Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0–01(London: Ministry of
Defence, 1996), 4.8–9.
106.Design for Military Operations,3.
107.British Defence Doctrine, 1.4. - B. J. C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy (eds.),The Operational Art: Develop-
ments in the Theories of War(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 4. - Andrea Barbara Baumann, ‘Clash of Organisational Cultures? The Challenge of
Integrating Civilian and Military Efforts in Stabilisation Operations’,Journal of the
Royal United Services Institute, CLIII, no. 6 (December 2008), 70–3. - Irwin,The Levels of War,8.
- James Fergusson,A Million Bullets: The Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan
(London: Transworld, 2006), 324; the figures for the First World War are derived
from a daily output of roughly 15,000 rounds per day in 1916 for an army of 200,000
men. - Alberto Palazzo,Moltke to Bin Laden: The Relevance of Doctrine in the Contemporary
Military Environment(Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, September 2008), 2. - Broadly speaking, it welcomed the criticisms contained in ‘Losing their way? The
British army suffers from lack of soldiers, lack of money and lack of conviction’,
Economist, 29 January 2009. See also Warren Chin, ‘Why did it all go wrong?
Reassessing British Counterinsurgency in Iraq’,Strategic Studies Quarterly(Winter
2008), 119–35; David Betz and Anthony Cormack, ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and British
Strategy’,Orbis, LIII (2009), 319–36; Michel Goya, ‘La frustration britannique’,
chapter 14 ofIrak: les arme ́es de chaos(Paris, 2008). - Alberto Palazzo,Moltke to Bin Laden,1.
- John Nagl,Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya
and Vietnam(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002). - Deborah Avant,Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral
Wars(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 103–26.
136 The Evolution of Operational Art