Contrary to the popular view, the US military did give considerable attention
to studying war’s second grammar in the form of a Maoist-style people’s war. The
US army, for instance, produced several doctrinal publications in the early 1950s,
at the height of the Korean conflict: FM 31-20Operations against Guerilla Forces
(February 1951), FM 31-21Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare(Octo-
ber 1951; updated 1955 and 1958), and FM 31-15Operations against Airborne
Attack, Guerilla Action, and Infiltration(January 1953). In addition, articles began
to appear more frequently in professional journals regarding guerrilla warfare and
how to counter it. Clearly, fighting the Chinese People’s Liberation Army had
raised interest in the potential existence of a second grammar of war. The
doctrine was revised and updated throughout the Vietnam conflict, particularly
as the US special forces expanded: FM 31-15Irregular Forces(May 1961), FM 31-16
Counterguerilla Operations(February 1963; updated March 1967), FM 31-22U.S.
Army Counterinsurgency Forces(November 1963), FM 31-73Advisor Handbook for
Counterinsurgencies(April 1965), andAdvisor Handbook for Stability Operations
(October 1967). To be sure, some of the methods outlined in this growing body of
doctrine could be described as heavy-handed, to say the least. 58 Still, the problem
was not that a knowledge base did not exist, or was not being cultivated; rather, it
was that the knowledge was considered exclusive, applicable only to those with
specialized training; that is, not to general-purpose forces.
THE VIETNAM CONFLICTThe use of overwhelming combat power, which, as we have seen, had long been
central to American operational art, was severely challenged during the Vietnam
conflict. With the expansion of nuclear arsenals after the Korean War, realization
set in that the United States would not have time to mobilize to the extent it had
hitherto in the event of a major war. Mobilization locations and supply depots
would provide lucrative targets for nuclear strikes. A strategic reserve was con-
stituted and a system of reserve call-up implemented and reformed, but their
timely arrival in the event of a general conflict was considered unlikely. Instead of
a system of prolonged mobilization and deployment designed to crush an
opponent with mass, war stocks had to be compiled and positioned in advance
at strategic locations, and units stationed in Europe and Korea had to be prepared
to fight with what they could carry, or could obtain through local means.
Operational theory and doctrine, while still centred on the idea of concentrating
overwhelming combat power at the decisive point, also began to consider the idea
of fighting outnumbered and winning. The concept of active defence was one
expression of that.
Meanwhile, US policy gradually shifted from massive retaliation to flexible
response. As this shift occurred, the US military was expanded so that it could
respond better to limited wars, such as the Korean conflict, and insurgencies,
what Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara referred to as Third World
152 The Evolution of Operational Art