else, received little attention during the Cold War, since they would have taken
valuable training time and other resources away from preparing for combat with
the Warsaw Pact.
THE FIRST PERSIAN GULF WAR, 1990–1Even though the first Gulf War was fought largely according to the principles of
AirLand Battle doctrine, a portion of the campaign was shaped by the ideas of a
new generation of air power theorists, of whom US Air Force Colonel John A.
Warden III was perhaps the most famous. 76 In 1988, Warden published a text
outlining how long-range precision-strike technology could be used to target a
foe’s leadership and will to fight, while avoiding not only costly ground cam-
paigns, but also the extensive destruction traditionally associated with strategic
bombing. 77 The central concept was that an adversary’s leaders could be ‘decapi-
tated’, paralysed, or neutralized, by striking certain communications and infra-
structural (and even cultural) targets simultaneously. Although Warden’s ideas
had begun to circulate within the air force, they were by no means mainstream.
Nonetheless, the Gulf War provided an opportunity to put the theory to the test,
at least partially, particularly as Warden was put in charge of the planning cell
within the Pentagon responsible for developing targeting options. 78
The Gulf War was divided into two phases: Desert Shield, which was defensive
in nature, designed to deter further Iraqi aggression, in particular an invasion
into Saudi Arabia; and Desert Storm, which was a combined and joint counter-
offensive aimed at expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait, unless they withdrew by
15 January 1991, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution. In a
style reminiscent of AirLand Battle doctrine, the United States and its coalition
partners marshalled some 680,000 troops, 3,000 tanks, 2,000 aircraft, and 100
warships for the counter-offensive, while Saddam Hussein had at his disposal
some 336,000 troops and 9,000 tanks. 79
The counter-offensive consisted of two phases: an air phase and a ground
phase. The air phase began on 17 January 1991, with most Iraqi command and
control facilities and anti-aircraft defences being knocked out within hours. A key
feature of this phase was the use of Tomahawk cruise missiles and F-117 stealth
fighters. Once air superiority was established, the air campaign shifted to knock-
ing out Iraqi armour and artillery pieces; it was estimated that nearly a third of
Iraqi combat capability was destroyed during this phase.
The land phase of the counter-offensive opened on 24 February 1991, and
lasted barely 100 hours. Coalition mechanized forces swiftly executed an envel-
oping movement around the Iraqi right flank, cutting off large numbers of
fighting formations. Iraqi units deserted wholesale or were quickly smashed by
the superior firepower of coalition forces. Images of the ‘Highway of Death’ filled
television screens and the covers of popular magazines. In anticipation that such
images might generate a popular backlash against further prosecution of the war,
156 The Evolution of Operational Art