In yet another aspect of the indirect approach, the IDF had left the capture of
most of the Gaza Strip to the later stages of the war—2–3 November—until the
Egyptian dispositions in the rear of the city of Gaza and Han Yunes fell into Israeli
hands. In 1967, Egypt was expecting an attack at the central axis of the Sinai, as
had occurred in 1956. The Israeli ground forces’ main effort, however, was
focused at the northern axis. Between the morning of 5 June and the morning
of 6 June, the 7th Armoured Brigade manoeuvred in the direction of Rafah and
el-Arish, penetrating between the 20th and 7th Egyptian Brigades. At the same
time, paratroopers encircled Rafah from the south, attacking it from the suppo-
sedly impassable dunes. On 6 June, Tal’s forces continued advancing westward
towards el-Arish and the Suez Canal.
On the central axis, on 5 June, Abraham Yoffe’s division moved towards Bir-
Lakhfan. In a manoeuvre very similar to the one carried out by the IDF during
Operation Horev in 1948–9, on 6 June, a brigade from Yoffe’s division, led by
Colonel Yishka Shadmi, penetrated between the Egyptian strongholds at the
northern axis (where Israel Tal’s division was fighting), and the central axis
(where Sharon’s division was advancing), heading to Bir Lakhfan, encountering
only one Egyptian company on its way. Shadmi’s brigade arrived at the Egyptian
rear, blocking the reinforcement lines at Jebel Libni, thereby easing Tal’s opera-
tional effort. On 7 June, tanks from Shadmi’s brigade moved more than 150
kilometres among Egyptian forces in the direction of the Mitla and Gidi Passes,
reaching them despite the difficulties. They blocked both passes with only nine
tanks, keeping them closed until the retreating Egyptian forces were destroyed.
On the southern axis, late at night on 5 June, the Um Katef stronghold was
attacked by Ariel Sharon’s division, which followed in the footsteps of its recon-
naissance unit that had moved along the northern flank of the stronghold in
ostensibly impassable dunes. One paratrooper force waited for nightfall in order
to land troops from helicopters in the Egyptian artillery’s rear, managing to
neutralize it. Having broken through the thin flank of the Egyptian trenches
and having taken the northern segment of the trench system during the night, a
path was opened in the morning of 6 June for Israeli tanks to engage the Egyptian
armour in the perimeter.
The most notable expression of the indirect approach on the Jordanian Front
was the envelopment carried out by combined forces from the central and
northern commands. The attack was launched from the south (the Jerusalem
area) and north (the Jenin area) along the mountainous terrain of East Samaria,
forcing the Jordanians to retreat eastward. The fall of the Samaria region into
Israeli hands triggered the collapse of the Judea region almost without a fight.
Concentration of forces
The IDF concentrated forces against the Arab war coalitions of 1948 and 1967
according to ‘the logic of the few’, determining in advance where the main effort
would be built in order to amass sufficient forces at that point for achieving a
battlefield decision. Further concentrations of forces were to follow sequentially
The Rise and Fall of Israeli Operational Art, 1948–2008 173