an airbase in the Sinai, and when the Egyptian troops were occupied with routine
preparations for a new day. The attack resulted in Israeli air supremacy, which
contributed heavily to the ground effort.
Blitzkrieg
Putting aside the question of whether blitzkrieg is a strategy or a tactic, a doctrine
or warfare, 23 it was one of Israel’s best expressions of operational art. It brought
about the enemy’s psychological collapse, shortened the war’s duration, and
achieved a battlefield decision before the superpowers or a significant number
of Arab expeditionary forces had the chance to intervene. Blitzkrieg was first
applied in 1956 but reached its peak in 1967 thanks to the fast advance of Israeli
tanks into enemy territory, which was effectively supported by a decentralized
logistical system and aerial protection and enabled by a mission-oriented com-
mand and control system and the high quality of field commanders (see below).
The operational plan prepared by Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan prior to the 1956
war constituted, perhaps for the first time in Israel, a clear blitzkrieg orientation.
Dayan’s instructions to the forces were to advance as quickly as possible in the
Sinai while bypassing the enemy’s main strongholds and avoiding frontal engage-
ments. The main idea of the deep penetration was to arrive in the Suez Canal area
as soon as possible, serving as a pretext for the great powers to issue an ultimatum
to both Israel and Egypt to withdraw from the canal zone; otherwise, they would
have to intervene. Egypt’s expected refusal to comply would then serve as the
trigger for such intervention. In practice, though, neither the IDF’s attack on Abu
Agheila nor the one on Rafah was indirect. The IDF troops faced great difficulties
in capturing the strongholds, but that became considerably easier following the
Egyptian high command’s retreat order that had been issued on 1 November after
the great powers’ attack in the canal zone.
Ironically, the seeds of Israeli tank-based blitzkrieg were sown in the Sinai War
as a result of an unauthorized movement of the 7th Armoured Brigade. The
commanding officer of the Southern Command, Colonel Assaf Simhonni, vio-
lated Dayan’s explicit instruction to refrain from using armour during the initial
stages of the war in order to lower the profile of the Israeli operations in the Sinai
until the great powers joined the war. Once they were given the order to move,
Israeli tanks took part in the fighting at the northern and central axes, advancing
long distances each day without major technical problems. Had it not been for a
fledgling logistical system (which was not yet sufficiently adjusted to support the
blitzkrieg); the limited mobility of the infantry, the artillery, and the engineering
corps; and the direct confrontations with Egyptian strongholds, the IDF might
have completed its missions even faster.
During the mid-1960s, the IDF underwent major logistical reform. From then
on, divisions or brigades were directly in charge of ‘pushing’ supplies to their own
forces along the lines of operation. 24 The motivation to do so was high, the
communication lines were relatively short, and personal acquaintances between
the providers of supplies and the fighting forces made the mission simpler.
176 The Evolution of Operational Art