overlook is the fact that attention to asymmetries has long been a staple in the
conduct of war. This is especially true for the weaker side in a conflict that seeks to
avoid fighting at a time and place of the adversary’s choosing where the enemy
can utilize its strengths and there is a high probability of defeat. Instead, a shrewd
general plays to the strengths of his own forces and focuses his efforts on
confronting the enemy in a manner, time, and place which would best exploit
the weaknesses of his adversary. Indeed, the fundamental assumption of Mao
Zedong’s strategic principles of ‘people’s war’ was that the Chinese Communists
were far weaker militarily at the outset of the conflict than their adversaries and
that this was likely to remain a reality for a considerable period of time. This was
true when the Communist movement was an insurgent force seeking to defeat the
ruling Kuomintang (KMT—also transliterated as Guomindang) or Nationalist
regime of Chiang Kai-shek (also transliterated as Jiang Jieshi); it has also been
true since the late 1940s when the Communists became the rulers of mainland
China and in 1949 formally established the PRC, becoming a major power but
one significantly weaker than the two superpowers, not just militarily, but
economically and diplomatically as well. In both eras, the weaker Chinese Com-
munist side adopted the principles of people’s war in preparation to battle more
powerful adversaries.
China has historically and traditionally been a continental military power. The
focus of operational art has thus been on land warfare, although this began to
change by the close of the twentieth century. This did not mean that maritime
conflict was completely ignored, but it did mean that it tended to be seen as
peripheral or an adjunct to operations on dry land. 11 Notable exceptions to the
rule were the four voyages of Ming dynasty Admiral Zheng He in the early
fifteenth century. As impressive as these expeditions were, they were less opera-
tions of a military nature to defeat adversaries and conquer new lands than they
were voyages of discovery and exploration. It has only been during the last two
decades or so that China’s armed forces have begun to make sea power a national
priority. Under the leadership of Admiral Liu Huaqing and others, the PRC
commenced a sustained build-up of naval power. In the twenty-first century,
the PLA has begun integrating maritime operations, including amphibious war-
fare, submarine warfare, mine warfare, as well as the use of short-range ballistic
and cruise missiles. China’s presumed adversary is the United States, and all these
capabilities are intended to counter the more powerful and capable US navy,
most likely in a Taiwan scenario. 12 The goal is to slow or deny US forces access to
the theatre by leveraging China’s more modest operational capabilities. The
upshot, in the apt words of Thomas Christensen, is a Chinese military capable
of ‘posing problems [for the U.S. armed forces] without catching up’. 13
In essence, the history of the operational art as studied and practised by China’s
Communist leaders is the evolution and adaptation of a strategy of weakness to
counter the superior strength of successive adversaries in response to changing
conditions. 14 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formally founded in
1921 in the city of Shanghai and initially developed as an urban movement.
However, within six years it was forced to reinvent itself as a rural movement and
The Chinese Way of War 197