invading Japanese forces in China’s tributary kingdom of Korea waged by impe-
rial forces, Chinese generals employed a combination of bloody frontal assaults in
broad daylight and surprise raids against key targets behind enemy lines under
cover of darkness. The campaign, led by veteran Chinese commander Li Rusong,
was hard fought, waged against battle-hardened Japanese troops. One of the most
costly victories in the campaign was the capture of Pyongyang in 1593. On
8 February, in a ferocious urban one-day battle, Chinese forces unleashed a
devastating ‘combination of cannon fire and brutal street fighting’ that succeeded
in driving Japanese forces out of the city after inflicting an estimated 12,000
fatalities on the enemy (see also ‘Man and Technology’, below). In contrast, three
months later, in mid-May 1593, Chinese forces captured the city of Seoul without
any bloodshed. The dramatic victory was achieved by a stealth night-time foray
on a major Japanese supply depot that was successfully destroyed. As a result, the
Japanese garrison abandoned Seoul without a fight. 28
Orthodox and unorthodox methods were used during Communist military
campaigns to unify China following the end of the Second World War. Some
Communist victories were won in brutal battles, while others were won in blood-
less negotiated surrenders. Illustrative examples can be drawn from the Ping–Jin
campaign noted above. The advance on the city of Tianjin involved ‘a series of
long, bloody battles’. 29 The capture of Tianjin was achieved on 17 January 1949
after three days of bitter fighting. The capture of Beiping, meanwhile, was achieved
without firing a shot—a week later, on 20 January, the KMT commander General
Fu Zuoyi (whose daughter was a Communist) negotiated a deal to surrender the
garrison. By 27 January, KMT troops had completed a peaceful evacuation of the
city. 30 However, the remarkably impressive unorthodox manner in which victory
was achieved in the latter instance would almost certainly not have been possible
without the hard-fought kinetic victory in the former instance. In other words,
unless the steely resolve and combat capabilities of the besieging Communist force
had been clearly demonstrated on nearby Tianjin, Beiping’s defenders might have
been more prepared to resist stubbornly and fight. 31
Orthodox and unorthodox methods were also employed by commanders of
the Chinese forces who participated in the Korean War. Elements of deception,
surprise, and stealth were utilized to considerable effect, but were combined with
orthodox methods, such as frontal assaults with massed artillery barrages. De-
ception was a hallmark of China’s intervention in the Korean War from the very
outset. The very title given to the forces dispatched to Korea was intended to
deceive or, at least, provide Beijing a fig leaf of plausible denial. While the units
that surreptitiously crossed the Yalu River under cover of darkness starting in
mid-October 1950 were officially dubbed the ‘Chinese People’s Volunteers’
(CPV), they were actually PLA units with their badges and patches carefully
removed. Of course, no one believed that Chinese troops had intervened of
their own volition, but the fiction of ‘volunteerism’ allowed Chinese soldiers to
operate in Korea without requiring Beijing to declare itself formally a belligerent.
Such a declaration of war, among other things, would have obligated the Soviet
Union, under the terms of the January 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance treaty, to enter
The Chinese Way of War 203