- Allen S. Whiting,The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina(Ann Arbor,
MI: University of Michigan Press, 1975). - The classic case was in Korea. While the CPV’s pause in fighting in November 1950 has
been interpreted by Whiting as Chinese signalling, Christensen has demonstrated that
this lull was actually a strategic pause. See Christensen,Useful Adversaries, ch. 5. - Scobell, ‘Is There a Chinese Way of War?’, 119.
- See guidelines 2, 3, 5, and 6 of Mao’s operational principles: ‘The Present Situation and
Our Tasks’, 161. - Scobell, ‘Is There a Chinese Way of War?’, 118. See also Ron Christman, ‘How Beijing
Evaluates Military Campaigns: An Initial Assessment’, in Burkitt and Wortzel,The
Lessons of History, 253–92. - For discussion and analysis of the beliefs of Chinese strategists about their own
strategic traditions, see Scobell,China’s Use of Force, ch. 2. For discussion of Chinese
beliefs about US and Japanese strategic traditions, see Scobell,China and Strategic
Culture(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 14–23. - For more analysis, see Blasko,The Chinese Army Today, ch. 7; and Andrew J. Nathan
and Andrew Scobell,China’s Search for Security(New York: Columbia University Press,
forthcoming 2011), ch. 11. - This case is complex. For a detailed examination, see Scobell,China’s Use of Military
Force, ch. 7. - See Nathan and Scobell,China’s Search for Security, ch. 11.
- John W. Lewis and Xue Litai,Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 38–9.
The Chinese Way of War 221