The forces and agencies deployed are usually provided by a number of different
states, IGOs, and NGOs. Each has its own strategic reason for its contribution and
an idea of the reward for it. Although clearly related to achieving the operation’s
purpose, these national goals are not the same as those of the multinational
organization. As a result, the state providing a contribution will often restrict the
use of its contribution to fulfilling its national goals rather than those of the
multinational organization. Additionally, and contributing to this national bias,
states are responsible for supporting their own contingents, their legitimacy, and
sustaining their presence in the theatre. To make this manageable, states take on
particular tasks, defined by area or function. This is as true of the agencies as it is
of the military forces. Each state, IGO, and NGO maintains a linkage between its
own strategy and its contribution. The linkage represents the interest of the state
or organization in the rewards for it and the risks to be gained by their contribu-
tion, rather like a shareholder in a commercial company who has invested to gain
income and capital rather than to trade in something. However, unlike the
relationship of the shareholder and the company, the state retains considerable
control over the use of its contribution by the organization it has charged with
the venture. The result is that the multinational force cannot operate to a single
purpose or even a set of priorities. This and the foregoing paragraphs also explain
why it is so difficult to define success in these wars of confrontation and conflict.
These multinational deployments are not always organized as a piece. One
organization may deal with military matters and another with development.
Afghanistan is probably an extreme example of this fact. There are three military
organizations, each receiving strategic direction from a different source: NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a US Force (Operation Enduring
Freedom), and the Afghan security forces. In addition, and apart from the Afghan
government, there are the UN’s agencies, the EU, national agencies such as the
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfiD) or the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and many
NGOs, all seeking to support and develop the state. Whatever sources they have
for strategic direction are not as a rule the same as the military. The result is
incoherence in strategic direction and definition of objectives. There are ample
examples in many deployments of these agencies and the military working
together successfully at low tactical levels. Within the limits of language, training,
equipment, and their national restraints, they cooperate effectively. But usually
the results of their endeavours do not sit within a coherent pattern of achieve-
ment that amounts to a campaign. Indeed, because of the lack of strategic coher-
ence, nobody or no agency is responsible for conducting the all-encompassing
campaign to achieve coherence of action in the theatre of operations.
In war amongst the people, those engaged in operational art must reconcile the
achievement of two objectives: that of the conflict and that of the confrontation.
This is true to both armies and their opponents. The two conflictual objectives can
be understood to be directly opposed—this is a battle in which each seeks to win—
but this is not necessarily the case with the two confrontational objectives. For
example, the opponent may want law and order and good roads, and you may also
Epilogue 237