The Evolution of Operational Art. From Napoleon to the Present

Major with a comprehensive order valid for all the corps. This done, they could
have used his directive as a basis for writing to each marshal separately. As it was,
the corps often received double and sometimes conflicting orders, one from
Napoleon and the other from Berthier. Indeed, it was precisely the function of
the latter, struggling manfully, to try and put some kind of order in this; usually,
he succeeded well enough for things to proceed, but sometimes he did not.
With this we come to the last, and most important, point. Well matched against
his opponents, technologically speaking, Napoleon’s secret in bringing about
operational warfare was not that he had at his disposal more, or better, informa-
tion than those opponents did. Instead, it is found in the fact that, thanks to the
three above-mentioned institutions and the way he made them work together, he
and theGrande Arme ́ewere able to functionwithouthaving such information. In
fact, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the ability to do so is the
supreme test by which any military organization must ultimately be measured.
The following poem, attributed to the Chinese sage Lao Tzu (‘the Old Master’, who
probably lived in the sixth-century BC), sums up the matter as well as anybody can:

Thirty spokes are joined together in a wheel,

but it is the center hole that allows the wheel to function.

We mold clay into a pot,

but it is the emptiness inside that makes the vessel useful.

We fashion wood for a house,

but it is the emptiness inside that makes it livable.

We work with the substantial,

but the emptiness is what we use. 50

NOTES

1. On the way Alexander, for example, did these things; see D. W. Engels, ‘Alexander’s
   Intelligence System’,Classical Quarterly, 74, 2, 1980, 327–40.


2. For the way the Romans, for example, used all these sources, see N. J. E. Austin and
   M. B. Rankov,Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the
   Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople(London: Routledge, 1995), 64–85.
   3.Bellum Civile(London: Heinemann, Loeb Classical Library, 1963), III. 36.1.


3. Ibid., 45.
   5.Bellum Africanum(London: Heinemann, Loeb Classical Library, 1946), 12.


4. Joshua 8:15.


5. On such systems, see the Book of Esther, 3:13, 8:10, 8:14; Herodotus,The Histories
   (London: Heinemann, Loeb Classical Library, 1961–6), viii. 98; Xenopohon,Cyropaedia
   (London: Heinemann, Loeb Classical Library, 1949), 6.17; Procopius,Anecdota(Lon-
   don: Heinemann, Loeb Classical Library, 1953–4); H. C. Bra ̈uer, ‘Die Entwicklung des
   Nachrichtenverkehrs: Eigenarten, Mittel und Organisation der Nachrichtenbefo ̈rder-
   ung’, Diss. (Friedrich-Alexander-Universita ̈t, Nu ̈rnberg, 1957), 56ff.; and A. M. Ramsay,
   ‘The Speed of the Roman Imperial Post’,Journal of Roman Studies, 15, 1929, 60–74.

32 The Evolution of Operational Art