force must be larger than previously accepted—an army corps at least. The larger
the numbers, the more the possibilities of ‘fog and friction’. And in Moltke’s
words, a good horseman does not drive even the boldest steed against an
insurmountable obstacle. 22
Moltke’s solution was to mount the flank attack outside the tactical level—in
what hindsight calls an operational context. Prospects for success improved
exponentially when forces could be concentrated on the field from different
points against the enemy front and flank. It should be noted that Moltke still
presented that process as strategy. But events in 1866 and 1870 demonstrated that
a distinction was emerging between movement to theatre and advance to con-
tact. 23
Moltke understood from the 1850s that railroads made possible the movement
of large forces in short time periods to a common destination, with men and
animals arriving in good condition: neither softened by long stretches in freight
wagons nor worn out by long approach marches. Railroads also facilitated
systematic resupply even into the war zone, diminishing the strain on traditional
logistic systems. Initially, he processed this development in a tactical context of
bringing superior numbers to a decisive point. Increasingly as well he addressed
the problems generated by an embarrassment of riches: how best to move a large
force brought to one place forward on what were still very limited road networks
while keeping it out of its own way. 24
Prussia’s use of railroads in 1866 to deploy forces simultaneously to widely
separated areas outside the zone of operations, then advancing to concentration,
was not a grand plan. It reflected rather King William’s reluctance to authorize
mobilization for a ‘brothers’ war’, and the limits of Prussia’s railway system in
terms of layout and track mileage. When Prussia’s concentration was complete,
the Elbe Army’s three divisions were at Torgau, the 1st Army’s six divisions were
150 kilometres further east at Go ̈rlitz, and eight more were in Silesia with the 2nd
Army, almost 200 kilometres’ distance from the 1st Army. Prussia would have to
advance into Bohemia, no matter what Benedek decided to do, in order to have
any hope of concentrating its forces. Not to worry, Moltke assured William. No
matter which way the Austrians turned, towards Silesia or to meet the threat from
Prussian Saxony, he would be enmeshed in an operational net, with the unen-
gaged elements of the Prussian army closing on his flanks and rear.
The Prussians fought their way into Bohemia in a series of blistering encounter
battles that constrained their opponents to fall back on the fortress of Ko ̈niggra ̈tz
on the Elbe River. By 2 July, Moltke’s subordinates and their chiefs of staff were
convinced they had taken as much risk as was acceptable in marching divided
into the theatre of war. The time had come to fight united. He insisted on the
continuing advantages of separate, simultaneous advances against the Austrians’
front and flanks. King William decided in Moltke’s favour—not least because he
seemed the most sure of himself with the clearest sense of what to do next. In fact,
what Moltke had was a good card player’s poker face. Not until a patrol brought
definitive information on the enemy position later that night was Moltke able to
issue final orders for the next day: the 1st Army was to pin the Austrians frontally,
40 The Evolution of Operational Art