The Evolution of Operational Art. From Napoleon to the Present

tactics that could expand and extend wars, but could not win them. War may be
an art form, but if one’sme ́tieris painting miniatures, carving sculptures is likely
to be an overstretch.

NOTES

1. Shimon Naveh,In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory
   (London: Frank Cass, 1997).


2. Dennis E. Showalter, ‘Milita ̈rgeschichte als Operationsgeschichte: Deutsche und amer-
   ikanische Paradigmen’, inWas ist Milita ̈rgeschichte, eds. T. Ku ̈hne and B. Ziemann
   (Paderborn: Scho ̈ningh, 2000), 115–26.


3. Robert M. Citino,The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third
   Reich(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005). Cf. Dennis E. Showalter,
   ‘German Grand Strategy: A Contradiction in Terms?’Milita ̈rgeschichtliche Mitteilun-
   gen, 48 (1990), 65–102.


4. See C. E. Heller and W. A. Stoft (eds.),America’s First Battles, 1776–1965(Lawrence,
   KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986).


5. These points are developed in Dennis E. Showalter,The Wars of Frederick the Great
   (London: Pearson Education, 1996); and in Christopher Duffy,Frederick the Great: A
   Military Life(London: Routledge, 1985).


6. Adelheid Simisch, ‘Armee, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft. Preussens Kampf auf der “inneren
   Linie”’, inEuropa im Zeitalter Friedrichs des Grossen. Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Kriege, ed.
   B. Kroener (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), 41ff.
   7.Tactique et manoeuvres des prussiens. Piece posthume, par M. le D. de G.(n.p., 1767), is
   an eyewitness summary of the pre-war manoeuvres.


7. Claus Telp,The Evolution of Operational Art, 1740–1813: From Frederick the Great to
   Napoleon(London: Routledge, 2005), establishes the institutional and conceptual
   inhibitors of operational thinking in the Frederickian era generally.


8. Franz Szabo,The Seven Years War in Europe, 1756–1763(London: Pearson Education,
   2007), is perhaps the sternest critic of Frederick since Macaulay.


9. Johannes Kunisch,Friedrich Der Grosse. Der Ko ̈nig und seine Zeit(Munich: C. H. Beck
   Verlag, 2004), 503–23, credits Frederick with less success in changing his image. Cf.
   James M. Sofka, ‘The Eighteenth Century International System: Parity or Primacy?’
   Review of International Studies,27 (2002), 147–63.


10. For the strategic aspects, cf. Frederick R. Kagan’s magisterialThe End of the Old
    Order: Napoleon and Europe, 1801–1805(New York: First Da Capo Press, 2006), 177
    passim; and Frederick Schneid’s streamlinedNapoleon’s Conquest of Europe: The War
    of the Third Coalition(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005). Brendan Simms,The Impact of
    Napoleon: Prussian High Politics, Foreign Policy, and the Crisis of the Executive,
    1797–1806(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), presents the politics
    and diplomacy.


11. Dierk Walter,Preussische Heeresreformen 1807–1870. Milita ̈rische Innovation und der
    Mythos der ‘Roonischen Reform’(Paderborn: Scho ̈ningh, 2003), 143–66, 235–324, is
    state of the art in scholarship and reasoning on the first Era of Reform.


12. Peter Hofschro ̈er’s volumes in the Osprey Campaign series,Lu ̈tzen & Bautzen 1813:
    The Turning Point(Oxford: Osprey, 2001), andLeipzig 1813: The Battle of the Nations

58 The Evolution of Operational Art