3
The Tsarist and Soviet Operational
Art, 1853–1991
Jacob W. Kipp
INTRODUCTIONThe origins of operational art in Russia are closely connected to the political-
military events that shaped the country between the Crimean War and the First
World War. Twice, after the Crimean War and after the Russo-Japanese War,
military defeat forced the tsarist regime to enact reforms to ensure Russia’s social
stability, economic modernization, and technological innovation. Both times,
Russian officers sought to adapt the military to new organizational requirements,
modernize tactics, and obtain modern armaments by domestic production and/
or foreign purchase. Thus, war became associated with social crisis, reform, and
ultimately revolution.
Defeat by the Anglo-French coalition in the Crimean War set off an era of
reform to create a modern economic base for the autocracy, and give it a modern
navy, a mass conscript army, a system of military districts to train that army, and a
strengthened general staff under the war minister. Military success by this new
army during the 1877–8 war with Turkey turned into political defeat when the
European powers rejected Russia’scoup de mainand forced it to give up its Balkan
gains at the Congress of Berlin. A crisis of autocracy followed, ending with the
assassination of Alexander II by terrorists and the assumption of power by his
son, Alexander III, who vowed to maintain autocracy, promoted capitalist devel-
opment, and made the alliance with republican France. The Russo-Japanese War
humbled Russian military pride, lost it two fleets, and set in motion a revolution
that threatened to sweep away the autocracy, which in its aftermath had grudg-
ingly granted political reforms and created a parliament, the Duma, with limited
legislative powers.
Veterans of the Russo-Japanese War undertook reform measures to make the
army ready for what they called ‘modern war’ and began to study the conduct of
operations, debate military doctrine, and create the command and control to
conduct the operations by fronts controlling multiple armies. In 1914, the
autocrat Nicholas II took Russia into another ‘popular’ war, but after three
years of mass industrial war, the monarchy lost its base of support with political