forces and stop the advance of Manstein’s armour, but these forces could not
liberate Belgorod. 46
As winter operations gave way to the springrazputista, the Germans had
retaken Kharkov and advanced to Belgorod. To the north, following Operation
Mars, Army Group Centre had conducted a staged withdrawal under Soviet
pressure to positions in front of Smolensk and Orel. Between these two positions,
the Soviet forces held a bulge in the line with the city of Kursk in its centre.
Both the OKH and the Stavka recognized the importance of the Kursk bulge and
after the heavy fighting in the winter of 1942–3 were aware that operational
objectives for the summer campaign of 1943 would have to be more limited. 47 For
the Germans, the OKH had to take into consideration not only the losses
sustained at Stalingrad, but also developments outside of the Eastern Front,
particularly the fact that the Panzer Army Africa was trapped in Tunisia and
being smashed to pieces by joint US and British forces.
With limited assets, the German high command needed a victory in the east to
rob the Red Army of the initiative before the Allied forces assembled in North
Africa could regroup and mount follow-on operations somewhere in the Medi-
terranean. Even a cursory look at the map of the Eastern Front led to the
conclusion that the Kursk bulge offered operational advantages. Striking from
Orel and Belgorod, the forces of Army Group Centre under von Kluge and Army
Group South under von Manstein could cut off the salient and trap the Soviet
forces with the pocket. Hitler approved Operation Citadel, but then delayed its
execution in May in order to permit the rearming of the German Panzer forces
with new technology.
During the same period, Vasilevsky ordered the main intelligence directorate
(GRU) of the general staff to assess the enemy situation in the sector of the front
covered by the Central, Voronezh, and South-Western Fronts. On 8 April, Zhukov,
basing himself on the initial intelligence assessment, identified the Kursk bulge as the
likely target for the Wehrmacht’s summer offensive. Addressing Soviet operational
goals for the summer of 1943, he proposed to Stalin that the Red Army not launch its
own summer offensive, but engage in the construction of a deeplyecheloned defence
of the bulge and accept the German blow. Zhukov proposed to bleed German
armour in a battle with this premeditated and deeply echeloned defence at Kursk
and then mount offensive operations north and south of the bulge. 48
The scale of forces deployed at Kursk suggests the magnitude of the struggle.
The OKH practically stripped the rest of the Eastern Front to get the mass of
armour and aviation deployed there. The Stavka released its reserves to the fronts.
While the Germans managed to come close to the Soviets in armour with
somewhat over 3,000 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled artillery, in the air
they were at a slight disadvantage in aircraft with the Soviets massing 2,900 planes
against about 2,050 for the Luftwaffe. But in manpower and artillery, the Soviets
achieved an overwhelming superiority of 1.1 million versus 430,000 men and
25,000 versus about 10,000 barrels. 49
On 5 July, General Model and Field Marshal von Manstein unleashed their
offensives against the northern and southern bases of the salient with the intention
The Tsarist and Soviet Operational Art, 1853–1991 79