required from the State Defence Committee. Soviet industry and Lend Lease were
now capable of supplying the Red Army with the weapons and means to conduct
manoeuvre warfare on a new scale and to supply sufficient stocks so that follow-
on offensive operations could be prepared as others were executed. In practising
operational art, Soviet commanders could afford to be more innovative. The
echelonment of attacking forces was the rule and not the exception. Air superi-
ority was a given in any major operation.
Though the Soviet spring offensive against Jassy–Kishenev having failed, the
Stavka used it to keep German attention focused on Army Group North Ukraine.
It also ordered the Karelian Front to attack the isthmus defences and Petroza-
vodsk, drawing attention away from Belorussia. Taking into account the many
streams and rivers in the Belorussian theatre, the Stavka augmented the attacking
units with additional engineering troops and bridging assets. For operational
security, radio communications were kept to a bare minimum with the head-
quarters relying on landlines. Zhukov and Vasilevsky were designated as Stavka
representatives for Bagration, with Zhukov overseeing the 2nd and 3rd Belorus-
sian Fronts, and Vasilevsky overseeing the 1st Baltic and the 1st Belorussian. The
plans as developed involved a first blow by these four fronts, which would strike
from the Pripiat Marshes to Nevel with the intent of encircling and destroying
the 3rd Panzer Army, the 4th Army, and the 9th Army and culminate in the
encirclement of Minsk. Zhukov worked closely with Rokossovsky in developing a
more sophisticated scheme for his initial attack, which would involve two break-
throughs by the 1st Belorussian Front. To accomplish this, the front’s boundaries
were expanded to permit the envelopment of Bobruisk by its forces, the 61st
Army and the 48th Army, while the 65th Army and the 3rd Army served as the
exterior armies for exploitation with the 65th enveloping Minsk from the south
and the 3rd advancing on Minsk from the east. 56 Follow-on objectives for these
fronts took the form of advances into Lithuania and Latvia towards the Baltic
coast south of Riga and within striking distance of East Prussia.
In the follow-up blow, Operation Lvov–Sandomierz, Konev’s 1st Ukrainian
Front, supported by the 1st Belorussian Front, would strike south of the Pripiat
along the Lvov and Lublin–Brest axes. Successes in this operation led the Stavka
to set deeper operational objectives for both fronts. The 1st Ukrainian was
ordered to advance and seize a bridgehead across the Vistula at Sandomierz
and the 1st Belorussian Front was ordered to clear the east bank of the Vistula
and seize bridgeheads across the Vistula at Pulawy and Demblin. The greatest
weight of the armour and mechanized forces was deployed with Konev’s front.
Before the launching of Bagration, the Stavka directed the main staff of the
partisan movement to organize attacks on German rail movement and commu-
nications. On 19 June, partisan detachments struck with enough effect to disrupt
rail movement for a day. Air support for Operation Bagration came from the 3rd,
1st, 4th, and 16th Air Armies, as well as Long-Range Aviation and Air Defence
Forces (PVO) with a total air strength of 5,300 aircraft. The Soviet air force, which
enjoyed a seven to one advantage over the Luftwaffe during Bagration, began the
campaign with powerful fighter sweeps to disrupt German air intelligence. As the
82 The Evolution of Operational Art