The Year of the French 135
his behalf. Whether Francis really intended to invade Savoy is open to question; he
may simply have hoped to annex those Savoy lands which lay on French soil566—a
goal only achieved by the treaty of Lyon in 1601, which ceded Bresse, Bugey,
Valromey, and Gex to France.567
After Charles V’s election as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519, Duke Charles of
Savoy became involved in escapades designed to halt the French advance into Italy.
He gave financial backing to Charles III duke of Bourbon, erstwhile constable
of France and the king’s sworn antagonist, in raising an imperial army to attack
Toulon and Marseilles, with the sub rosa intention of partitioning the French kingdom.
His loan (of jewellery) was the pretext subsequently given by Francis to justify his
conquest of Savoy in 1536!568 These intrigues came to nothing, but they left a leg-
acy of suspicion, even if King Francis later tried to keep Duke Charles sweet by
paying him an annual pension of £20,000 from 1527.569
Notwithstanding this douceur relations between King Francis and Duke Charles
remained chilly. The French monarch dusted off plans already laid in 1517 to seize
Nice, Savoy’s only seaport, though he did not succeed.570 By 1533 there was
mounting anarchy in Piedmont, so that Savoy seemed easy prey for a monarch
eager to avenge himself for the loss of Milan.571 He had little to fear from Bern,
whose relations with Savoy had soured to the point where the city could contem-
plate a French occupation of Savoy with some equanimity.572 And he was kept well
abreast of the unstable situation in Geneva.573
Hindsight might suggest that Bern was prepared to give France a free hand
provided that it gained control of the Vaud. This reading is too facile. It does not
address the key question, namely how far Bern was prepared to go (for whatever
reasons) to defend Geneva. Jacques Freymond’s conclusion, that armed conflict
might well have erupted in 1535 had it not been for Bern’s reluctance to go to
war,574 is accurate, but fails to explain that its reluctance was driven in part by ran-
cour at Geneva’s behaviour and in part by fear of being compelled to fight a war on
two fronts,575 namely against Savoy for control of the Vaud and against France for
control of Geneva. That fear was not groundless.
What is certain is that France had begun actively, if clandestinely, spying the
landscape in Geneva. Naturally, it is difficult to know precisely what the missions
were intended to achieve. The first of the scouts, Laurent Meigret, a mysterious
figure who had been a French courtier, appeared in the spring of 1535 and is
known to have negotiated with the Genevan magistrates over means to bring relief
to the city.576 Another French nobleman, François de Montbel, lord of Verey,
566 Freymond, ‘Politique’, 46–8, 50, 52. 567 HLS, s.vv. Bresse; Lyon, Vertrag von.
568 Freymond, ‘Politique’, 74. The duke of Bourbon was embittered by his failure to secure the
estates to which he believed he was entitled through his wife’s inheritance. He served as Emperor
Charles’s commander in the Sack of Rome in 1527.
569 Freymond, ‘Politique’, 88. 570 Freymond, ‘Politique’, 114–15.
571 Documenti di Storia Sabauda, 110; Freymond, ‘Politique’, 118.
572 Freymond, ‘Politique’, 121–2. 573 Freymond, ‘Politique’, 106–7.
574 Freymond, ‘Politique’, 122. 575 Feller, Geschichte Berns, 2, 370.
576 Monter, Calvin’s Geneva, 54; Santschi, Crises et Révolutions, 15.