Konstanz’s Dilemma 27
for fear of a Swiss military backlash. But once Frederick’s successor, King Maximilian,
had added his signature, and, more pertinently, after he had forced the ageing and
incompetent Archduke Sigismund into retirement in 1490, the league increasingly
took on the aspect of a Habsburg instrument to coerce the Swiss.108 Whether
Horst Carl, the undisputed authority on the Swabian League,109 is justified in
describing in colourful language the decade up to the Swabian War as a ‘focusing
and dramaturgical aggravation of latent conflicts’ between the Swabians and the
Swiss is a matter of judgement:110 here the undoubted propaganda war may
conceal more subtle undercurrents of discord which did not flow in a straight
line to open hostilities between self-defining enemies. At all events, Konstanz
was caught in the crossfire.
The VII cantons let it be known that any overture by Konstanz to the Swabian
League would be attended by swift reprisals.111 In 1489 Zürich specifically warned
Konstanz that the Swiss would occupy several of the bishop’s castles on both banks
of Lake Konstanz, since the latter, too, was under pressure to join the League.112
Whatever its own inclinations, Konstanz was constrained by the terms of the
Perpetual Accord, which had designated the city as an impartial arbiter in any con-
flict between Austria and the Confederation.113 A close reading of the sources
reveals, however, that the cantons were far from one mind over what stance to
adopt towards Konstanz. In 1490 Zürich modified its earlier threat by assuring
Konstanz of its support.114 The cantons were thrown into further disarray by an
offer from Maximilian in 1492 to renew the Perpetual Accord, provided that the
Swiss abandon their right of access to the four Forest Towns, in return for a one-off
payment of 10,000 fl and an additional 500 fl per annum for six years (later
extended to ten) to each canton.115 Despite temptation, five rural cantons—
Schwyz, Uri, Unterwalden, Zug, and Glarus—refused the bait.116
An underlying irresolution may be inferred from the refusal of certain cantons
on several occasions to send envoys to the diets equipped with full plenipotentiary
powers. By 1494 it became apparent that some cantons would have preferred
Maximilian to redeem the mortgage of the territorial court and transfer it to the
Confederation, rather than accepting the lure of his pensions.117 The following year
fresh efforts were made to seal an alliance with Konstanz to prevent it joining the
League.118 Then, in 1496 Schwyz put forward a bold solution to the interminable
108 Paul-Joachim Heinig, ‘Friedrich III., Maximilian I. und die Eidgenossen’, in Rück, Eidgenossen,
267–93, here at 284–5; Maurer, Konstanz im Mittelalter, 209.
109 Horst Carl, Der Schwäbische Bund 1488–1534. Landfrieden und Genossenschaft im Übergang
vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Reformation (Schriften zur südwestdeutschen Landeskunde, 24) (Leinfelden-
Echterdingen, 2000).
110 Carl, ‘Eidgenossen und Schwäbischer Bund’, 215.
111 Kramml, ‘Reichsstadt Konstanz’, 319.
112 Maurer, Konstanz im Mittelalter, 207. The castles were Gottlieben, Kastell, and Meersburg.
Heinig, ‘Friedrich’, 285 n 46; cf. EA III, 1, 299–300 (no. 328: i) (1488); 306–9 (no. 338: t) (1488).
113 Meyer, ‘Thurgau’, 15; Kramml, ‘Reichsstadt Konstanz’, 318.
114 EA III, 1, 309–11 (no. 339: d) (1490).
115 EA III, 1, 401–2 (no. 428: l) (1492); 413–14 (no. 437: b) (1492).
116 EA III, 1, 415–16 (no. 440: g) (1492). 117 EA III, 1, 470–1 (no. 494: i) (1494).
118 EA III, 1, 484–5 (no. 507: a) (1495).