The Burgundian Wars 77
January were as far removed from practical politics as could be imagined, above all
the notion that Yolande would declare war on Burgundy in the name of her son,
Duke Philibert, who was a minor. Yolande’s tactic was instead to play Bern off
against the other cantons. By the summer Yolande was offering to mediate between
Bern and the VI cantons, who were eager for peace, even to the point of offering a
subsidy of 80,000 fl (the sum for which the Outer Austrian lands had been mort-
gaged to Burgundy).93 Yolande’s motives were certainly not altruistic: Bittmann
believes that her ultimate aim was to humiliate or destroy Bern.94 Above all, Bern
could not overlook the fact that the duchess was continuing to afford Lombard
troops passage through Savoy via Geneva to Burgundy. In mid-August Bernese
peasants from the Saane valley ambushed a troop of Italian mercenaries at Aigle,
and went on to seize the town and district, installing a Bernese bailiff in place of a
Savoy official.95 Then in early September Bern reaffirmed its alliance with the
bishop and chapter of Sion, the city of Sion, and the Valais communes, whose task
was to blockade the St Bernard Pass.96 Yet Duchess Yolande still held back from
declaring war. What tipped the balance was the nine-year truce signed between
France and Burgundy in mid-September.97 With that, Charles the Bold secured
his back for an eastern campaign, undergirded by a peace treaty with Emperor
Frederick III in November, whereby Lorraine was silently left in Burgundy’s
hands.98 To cap it all, Count Jacob de Romont finally returned to the Vaud: Bern
and its allies feared the worst.
Bern decided that attack was the best form of defence. In October, Bern, together
with Fribourg and the Valais communes, declared war on Count Jacob—not, let it be
noted, on Duchess Yolande. They were soon joined by Solothurn. The assembled
army included a detachment from Luzern and freebooters from other cantons.
Within a fortnight they had conquered the entire Vaud, razing sixteen towns and
forty-three castles. The men of the Valais meanwhile occupied the Rhône valley as
far as St-Maurice. Garrisons which were slow to surrender were put to the sword;
the countryside was laid waste.99 Was this a deliberate scorched earth policy, an end
in itself? Or were there broader strategic aims? A letter sent from the army in the
field reported that Fribourg’s contingent was reluctant to march on Geneva,100 and
that any further action must depend on Fribourg and Solothurn’s consent.101
From Savoy’s point of view the loss of the Vaud, though painful, involved the
sacrifice of a territory which was somewhat peripheral to its strategic interests—
though that did not apply to the neighbouring Genevois. The loss of the Lower
Valais, on the other hand, long coveted by the Valais communes, was a deadly
blow. It cut off the Savoy heartlands from the outlying territories in the Vaud,
93 Bittmann, Memoiren, 874.
94 Bittmann, Memoiren, 881, 889. By what means he does not say.
95 Feller, Geschichte Berns, 1, 393. 96 EA II, 560–1 (no. 809).
97 EA II, 561–2 (no. 810). 98 Stettler, Eidgenossenschaft, 249.
99 Stettler, Eidgenossenschaft, 249; EA II, 564–5 (no. 813).
100 This may have been because news reached the camp that Anthony, bastard of Burgundy, was
approaching with an army of 3–4000 men.
101 EA II, 565–6 (no. 814) (and Appendix).