Keeping Kings in Check 91
Privateering was subject to some obvious abuses— chiefl y to the risk that
the privateers would not confi ne their depredations to vessels of the enemy
state, but would engage in indiscriminate plundering. To deal with this prob-
lem, it ca me to be requ ired t hat ships captu red by privateers had to be broug ht
before prize courts, so that the lawfulness of the capture could be adjudi-
cated. Th e value of the capture would be adjudicated, too, to ensure that the
government received its due share of the proceeds. With the passage of time,
it became common to require privateers to post bonds, that is, to put a sum
of money on deposit as a kind of insurance against damages that might be
owing later for unlawful seizures.
More than any other topic, that of reprisals and privateering vividly illus-
trates the pro cess of decentralized, do- it- yourself enforcement that is so closely
associated with international law. With suffi cient safeguards provided— such
as prize courts to adjudicate the lawfulness of captures and requirements that
privateers post bonds— the practice could provide some relief for victims of
violations of law. Also, the web of common practices among the maritime
states of Eu rope helped to provide a certain stability to the system. But
merchants— and other sorts of adventurers, too— sometimes ventured far
outside the region of Western Eu rope to farfl ung parts of the world, beyond
the reach of the law merchant or the ius commune, where even the bond of
the Christian religion was absent. In such cases, the law of nature— that sup-
posedly universal and eternal set of norms— would be the only legal guide. In
these disquieting circumstances, natural law would be called upon to shoulder
some heavy burdens.