96 Law and Morality Abroad (to ca. ad 1550)the course of his career, spent mostly in Iraq, he became one of the foremost
fi gures of the Hanafi te school and also did judicial service— from which,
however, he was dismissed by Haroun al- Rashid for tendering some unwel-
come legal advice. (A reconciliation later took place). Al- Shaybani wrote
two works on siyar, but his surviving writing on the subject is a portion of a
larger work on Islamic law. It covered such topics as peace treaties and safe-
conducts, territorial jurisdiction, diplomatic relations, the conduct of war,
neutrality, and civil strife.
On the subjects of war and treaty making, the position of Islamic states
diff ered signifi cantly from that of their Christian counterparts. It has been
observed that Eu ro pe an just- war doctrine had scarcely anything to do with
religion. A just war was basically a form of legal process— a means of com-
pelling wrongdoers to accord due recognition to the legal rights of the just
side. As such, it was a carefully limited and circumscribed action, fought for
the obtaining of some defi ned thing (or res) that was being wrongfully with-
held or denied. Th is meant, in turn, that just- war doctrine was as readily
applicable to relations with infi del powers as with Christian ones. Moreover,
Christians, from Augustine onward, were emphatic that peace was the nor-
mal or residual condition of life, and war the exception.
Th e Islamic conception of war was radically diff erent. Here, the dividing
line between the faiths was seen as fundamental and (nearly) unbridgeable.
Muslims were characterized in the Quran, the sacred book of the faith, as
being “harsh towards the disbelievers and compassionate towards each
other.” With the infi del world, in short, there was, in principle, a perpetual
state of war. Th e Quran warned Muslims that nonbelievers were their “sworn
enemies,” and it cautioned Muslims against taking Christians and Jews as
allies. Th is attitude was refl ected in the label given to the non- Muslim world
in general (though not by the Quran itself)— the Dar al- Harb, or “house of
war.” Contrasted to the Dar al- Harb was the Dar al- Islam, the realm of the
true faith. In principle, there could be no permanent peace treaty between
the two “houses.” More generally, it may be said that this sharply dualistic
conception left no conceptual space for an elaborate system, of the Eu ro-
pe an kind, for assessing rightful and wrongful resorts to force.
In an important sense, then, all Muslim wars against infi del powers—
off ensive and defensive alike— were regarded as, per se, just, provided that
an invitation to convert was given prior to the launching of hostilities. Th e