196 Reason and Its Rivals (ca. 1550– 1815)diff erent from the policy of cabinets.” And he was fully conscious that, “to
the disgrace of human nature,” many rulers would ridicule his work. But
he was determined to speak his (and Wolff ’s) mind nonetheless.
At the same time, though, there was a great deal of the bee in this self-
declared spider. Vattel, like Bynkershoek, wrote with the conscious inten-
tion of producing a work that would be useful. He expressly identifi ed his
intended readership as sovereigns and their ministers, rather than scholars.
And he was even hopeful that his words would command some attention in
those circles, on the somewhat optimistic thesis that “justice is inseparable
from sound statesmanship.” In many respects, his optimism proved well
founded. Th e book was much cited in court judgments over the following
generations. We have seen that it was consulted— or at least borrowed from
a library— by no less a fi gure than George Washington.
In his basic framework, Vattel followed Wolff closely. He echoed his pre-
de ces sor, for example, in holding that relations between states are governed
by a modifi ed form of natural law— modifi ed to take account of the special
interests of states. He adopted Wolff ’s twofold classifi cation of the duties of
states— the state’s duty to itself, to strive for “perfection,” and its duty to
other states, of general sociability. Most notably, he straightforwardly ad-
opted Wolff ’s fourfold division of the law of nations (into the natural, volun-
tary, stipulative, and customary laws). Like Wolff , he held the voluntary law
to be a set of norms arising deductively from “the natural liberty of Nations,
from considerations of their common welfare, from the nature of their mu-
tual intercourse.” It was therefore an expression of the natural sociability
of states, in the spirit of Aristotle. Vattel followed Wolff , too, in insisting that
this law is not “voluntary” in the sense that adherence to it is optional. It is a
law based on consent— but with “consent” being required to be given (i.e.,
required, that is, by natural law).
[W]hat we call the voluntary Law of Nations [explained Vattel] consists
in the rules of conduct, of external law, to which the natural law obliges
Nations to consent; so that we rightly presume their consent, without
seeking any record of it; for even if they had not given their consent, the
Law of Nature supplies it, and gives it for them. Nations are not free in
this matter to consent or not; the Nation which would refuse to consent
would violate the common rights of all Nations.