240 A Positive Century (1815–1914)In time, a somewhat more moderate form of voluntarism was advanced,
which was able to accommodate international law more readily than doctri-
naire neo- Hegelianism. Th e leading fi gure in this development was Georg
Jellinek. Originally from Austria, he was the son of a famous preacher in
Vienna’s Jewish community. At the University of Vienna, he studied phi-
losophy and history of art along with law and then, in 1879, became a pro-
fessor of law at that institution. He moved to the University of Basel in 1889
and to Heidelberg two years later, where he taught international law, along
with public law generally, for the remainder of his career. Jellinek, inciden-
tally, had a brother who was a prominent fi gure in the nascent German au-
tomobile industry— and who, in 1901, arranged to have a German auto
model named aft er his daughter Mercedès.
Mercedès’s uncle achieved a diff erent form of renown (not entailing status
as a house hold name) by devising a juridical model of “auto”— in the form,
that is, of a theory known as “autolimitation.” As the name implies, the basic
idea was that state sovereignty could be limited by self- imposed constraints
even if no external authority existed that could restrict it. Th e idea of auto-
limitation grew out of the philosophy of Kant, for whom voluntary adher-
ence to rules of law or ethics was seen as the highest form of moral con-
duct. Acting morally because one is compelled to do so by some superior
authority, under threat of punishment, represents, from this perspective,
merely the appearance of morality and not its true essence, which is the spon-
taneous or self- directed doing of good. Application of this line of reasoning in
the sphere of politics (as opposed to personal ethics) led to the concept known
(in German) as the Rechtsstaat (law state). Th is refers to a state that elects, of
its own free will, to operate according to the rule of law. Th e term was pop u-
lar ized in the framework of constitutional law by a German scholar named
Robert von Mohl. It was also supported by the prominent Roman- law
scholar and legal phi los o pher Rudolf von Jhering.
Th e Rechtsstaat meant a state that governs by means of the rule of law,
and not by mere momentary whim. Strictly speaking, a sovereign could gov-
ern by mere whim, since there is no external agent to constrain it from so
doing. But that would involve the state’s acting inconsistently with its own
inherent nature— which is to act methodically and rationally, rather than
arbitrarily and capriciously. Th e state, then, is “compelled” (so to speak) to
act according to law— compelled, however, not by the commands of an ex-