242 A Positive Century (1815–1914)the Rechtsstaat. Th eir solution to the challenge of world order was not to in-
stall a global sovereign to bring about order by force of command (Hobbes’s
solution to the anarchy of the primeval state of nature). Instead, it was to
leave each state free to pursue its own policies— while at the same time duly
respecting the rights of other states. Th e result is a world that is both anarchic
(i.e., having no central authority) and peaceful.
Th is neo- Kantian perspective, it should be appreciated, is an archetypal
picture of an emergent system of order— that is, of a system in which there is
no central authority and no external enforcement mechanism. Order emerges
because each actor, on its own, in the rational pursuit of its self- interest, sees
fi t to constrain its own behavior in certain ways. Underpinning this system is
a shared ethic of rationality and reciprocity— and also of self- discipline. Nev-
ertheless, it was always conceded by the autolimitation theorists that the in-
dividual states are the primary actors, with international law being second-
ary, in the sense that it is a product of their action. As Jellinek succinctly put
it, “International law exists for states, not states for international law.”
Th e voluntarist variant of positivism, then, presents a somewhat para-
doxical appearance, at least on fi rst acquaintance. On the one hand, it was
radically state- centered, to the point of being open to the accusation of de-
nying the very existence or possibility of international law. At the same
time, though, it accepted that relations between states are law- governed and
that states do not possess a license to act arbitrarily. Th e law that governed
interstate relations is not a single framework, applied to the states from the
outside. Instead, it is a sort of confederation or aggregation of separate bodies
of law, each craft ed by one individual state for application to itself. Interna-
tional law, then, does exist. But it exists not because of customary practices,
or the conclusion of law treaties, but because the self- draft ed legal codes of
the various individual states are suffi ciently similar and self- restraining in
nature— with the end result that the rights and interests of other states are
accorded due respect.
It may be observed that this approach to law bears a striking resemblance
to the conclusions of the Axelrod experiment on cooperation. Each actor
in the competition acted entirely selfi shly, pursuant to (literally) a self-
devised program. But the result was not chaos or confl ict. It became apparent
that a consistent policy of reciprocity and cooperation paid the highest
rewards— and it emerged from the competition between programs as the