254 A Positive Century (1815–1914)work. War is an instructive topic, too, in the way that it reveals the variant
positions of the three strands of positivism in action. Th e empirical version
of positivism had little diffi culty, at least in theory, in retaining the principal
tenets of just- war doctrine. With its focus on sanctions as an essential hall-
mark of law, the empirical group could readily keep to the old interpretation
of war as, in eff ect, a sanction against wrongdoing. It was, of course, a self-
help mea sure, but to international lawyers, a self- help component was en-
tirely compatible with a sanction.
Th e voluntarist approach was strikingly diff erent. With its intense focus
on the rights and interests of individual states, it was inclined to see war as
an exercise of state policy. To be sure, it would always be to a state’s own
advantage to obtain its goals as peacefully, and with as little cost, as possible.
But sometimes more drastic mea sures would be called for. In pursuit of an
interest that was suffi ciently vital, the extreme step of resorting to war can
and will be taken. Th is might seem to be a formula for unbridled aggression,
but the context in which this principle operated must be appreciated. It op-
erated in a world that was law- governed, and in which the freedom of action
of states was limited— even if (as noted earlier) the law and the limitations
were self- generated and self- imposed by the states individually.
It was therefore not envisaged that voluntarism amounted to a license for
mere malicious trampling on the rights of others. Rather, it was contended
that, when a given state’s own rights and interests are being restricted by
another state, then war is permissible, as a last resort, for rectifying the situ-
ation. In a certain respect, then, this picture of war was not so diff erent from
the just war one: war is permissible as a last resort means of putting a stop to
the trespasses of other states. Th e diff erence— and it was an important one—
was that war was now seen as permissible not only for the vindication of
legal rights but also in pursuit of bona fi de national interests.
War in the mainstream positivist view may be usefully regarded as a form
of dueling— by states, that is, rather than by individuals. Th is analogy re-
fl ects the positivist image of war as a contractual arrangement by the parties
to settle a quarrel by force of arms. A state of war can then be regarded as a
situation in which an agreement is in operation between two disputing par-
ties to settle a dispute by force of arms. In the positivist scheme, there
was no rule of international law prohibiting states from making such an
agreement— that is, there was no law against interstate dueling. Th e “prin-