256 A Positive Century (1815–1914)relations. And there was a strong concern to reduce the horrors and suff er-
ing of war by way of rules regulating the conduct of hostilities. In short, and
true to its scientifi c ethos, mainstream positivism took a somewhat clinical
picture of war, more in the spirit of a doctor discussing disease than of a
blustery conqueror lusting for new territories.
An exception to this characterization may be allowed in the case of the
more extreme partisans of neo- Hegelian thought. Erich Kaufmann was the
most notorious. In his book on treaties in 1911, he made it clear that he had
little regard for the optimistic outlook of the neo- Kantians, with their quest
for freedom and mutual self- respect. Instead, he looked at war as a great
moving force of history. It was the principal means by which a state could
achieve the highest degree of internal social solidarity, shared commitment,
and mutual dedication— qualities that Hegelian thinkers valued so highly.
“[N]ot the community of free willing individuals,” averred Kaufmann, “but
the victorious war is the social ideal.” Such an overt glorifi cation of war
was, however, highly unusual among international lawyers.
Th e Technocratic Outlook
One fi nal feature of the mainstream positivist synthesis calls for attention:
its interesting combination of dynamism and conservatism. Th is was made
possible— and indeed inevitable— by the positivists’ scientifi c and techno-
cratic self- image. Comte’s positive philosophy had been, at least in its incep-
tion, aggressively modernistic, representing a gleeful overthrowing of the
past. International lawyers did not, for the most part, adopt this aspect of
the new thinking. On the contrary, the international- law version of positiv-
ism had a very decidedly conservative cast. Th is was a legacy, in part, of
positivism’s conscious opposition to natural law, which had become associ-
ated with the po liti cal left. But it was also, in part, a function of positivism’s
claim (or ambition) to be a science of law— that is, an objective, neutral,
value- free analysis of what the law actually is and how it is made.
Th e single foremost sign of this conservatism was positivism’s insistence
on a sharp separation between law and morality, between the “is” and the
“ought.” As conscientious legal scientists, the positivists saw their mission as
the expounding of what the law actually is— with reform mea sures, and in-
deed policy decisions generally, left in the hands of politicians. Th is was the