Justice among Nations. A History of International Law - Stephen C. Neff

Dissident Voices 273

liberal policies around the world. Along with broad freedom of movement

of capital, and remarkably free movement of persons, too— with the require-

ment of passports for international travel even falling largely into disuse by

the late nineteenth century— the period became something of a golden age

of liberal economics.

Th e Birth of Human Rights
Liberals tended to devote much attention to protecting individuals from gov-
ernments. Th is was far from a new idea. Even Bodin, the early champion of
sovereignty, held that rulers were subject to the strictures of natural law— and
that these included a due respect for the established rights of others. Most
notably, this meant that rulers could not arbitrarily take the property of their
subjects. Liberalism went further than this, though, in placing the primary
emphasis not so much on the limitations on governments as on the possession
of positive rights by individuals themselves. Moreover, the rights that liberals
sought to protect went beyond vested property rights to include matters such
as liberty of expression and freedom of the press, of religion, and of assembly,
as well as safeguards for persons accused of criminal off enses.
Concern also extended to protecting individuals from oppression by for-
eign governments. Th e most tangible sign of this solicitude was the network
of friendship treaties that grew up between the Eu ro pe an trading states from
the seventeenth century onward. Th ese treaties continued to be concluded
in large numbers throughout the nineteenth century. But an important fur-
ther step was taken in this period. It began to be asserted that protection
from arbitrary oppression by foreign government did not depend on the ex-
istence of a treaty. Instead, it was asserted to be a general entitlement, under
customary international law— and, as such, applicable to all aliens against
any foreign government anywhere in the world. American Secretary of State
Elihu Root asserted, in 1910, that countries are under a general obligation to
conform to “an established standard of civilization” in their treatment of
foreign residents. Th is is, he maintained, “a standard of justice, very simple,
very fundamental, and of such general ac cep tance by all civilized countries
as to form a part of the international law of the world.” Shortly aft er this,
the American scholar Edwin Borchard held this “established standard” to
mean that foreigners are entitled to “a certain minimum of rights necessary