22 Law and Morality Abroad (to ca. ad 1550)by benevolence and harmony. Fourth and fi nally, the Confucians had
a low opinion of law in general. Rules and punishments were, of course,
sometimes necessary, especially when dealing with the lowly and uncouth
elements of society. But the Confucian ideal was of government by a be-
nevolent (and absolute) monarch, whose example of virtue would provide a
continuous education and inspiration to his subjects. Th e goal was the inter-
nalization of proper modes of conduct, rather than the imposition of rules
from outside.
Th e principal application of Confucian ideas to international relations
came not from Confucius himself, but from his follower of the fourth century
bc, Meng Zu (or Mencius in Latin form). At the heart of his thought was a
certain view of human nature: a belief in an innate goodness of human be-
ings, including rulers. Th is implied, in turn, a belief in a basically peaceful,
harmonious world of states. Mencius believed in the equality of states only
in the limited sense of holding that all states have an equal right to exist. But
here, as was the case within societies, the ethos of hierarchy and deference
was given a central role. Mencius maintained that large and powerful states
should play a leading role— but that they should play that role responsibly,
setting good examples for other states. He was explicitly opposed to wars of
conquest and to the subjection of one state to another, insisting instead on a
pluralistic world of separate states as the norm.
Mencius held consistently to a rule of nonintervention by states in the
internal aff airs of one another, to the point of emphasizing that, even in a
case of misconduct by a ruler within a state, other rulers should refrain from
taking punitive action. Only “a minister appointed by Heaven” should under-
take punishment of an oppressive sovereign, not the government of a neigh-
boring state. He explained his position by reference to the general Confu-
cian principle that punishment can be infl icted only by a superior upon an
inferior— and then pointing out that, in international aff airs, this necessary
relationship of superior to inferior is lacking.
By the same token, small states were expected by Mencius to show appro-
priate deference toward large ones. Th is took the form, most concretely, of
the payment of what is typically called tribute. In theory at least, tribute pay-
ment by small states to large ones was a voluntary, self- imposed action— an
ac know ledg ment of a general duty of respect owed by the humble to the
great, rather than a sign of legal or po liti cal subjection, as that term in