356 Between Yesterday and Tomorrow (1914– )secretaries of state served as judges: Charles Evans Hughes (who stepped
down to become chief justice of the American Supreme Court) and Frank
Kellogg. Other prominent judges included Hurst from the British foreign
offi ce, Manley Hudson of Harvard Law School, Rolin- Jaequemyns and
Charles de Visscher (both from Belgium), and Schücking, who became the
fi rst (and only) German judge on the Court in 1930. Th ree of the judges
served throughout the Court’s existence: Anzilotti, Bustamante, and Rafael
Altamira from Spain.
Th ere was, understandably, some curiosity as to how many states would
issue declarations under the Optional Clause accepting the compulsory ju-
risdiction of the Court. Th e fi rst to do so was Sweden— though, out of cau-
tion, only for a fi ve- year period. By September 1921, eleven other states had
made declarations, with fi ve of these following the Swedish lead of limiting
their declarations to fi ve- year durations. In 1928, the League Assembly
launched an eff ort to increase the use of the Optional Clause, with some
success. By 1932, some twenty- six states had issued declarations. On only
one occasion was an Optional Clause declaration withdrawn: by Paraguay
in 1938. Six states promptly objected, contending that Optional Clause dec-
larations, once issued, could not be withdrawn. Th e issue, however, was
not resolved.
Over the period of its operation (1922– 40), the Court handed down
twenty- fi ve judgments on the merits of contentious cases, plus twenty- seven
advisory opinions. Th e cases were of a somewhat miscellaneous character.
Th e very fi rst ones, decided in 1922, were three advisory opinions requested
by the International Labor Or ga ni za tion, for interpretations of labor treaties.
Th e ILO requested two further opinions on later occasions. Several cases
arose from the postwar treaties. One of them was the Wimbledon, as noted.
Several others arose out of the Treaty of Lausanne and the associated popula-
tion exchange between Greece and Turkey. In addition, questions of relations
between Poland and the Free City of Danzig reached the Court no fewer
than six times. Th e contribution of the Court’s case law to the development
of substantive international law was perhaps less than might have been ex-
pected. Th is was because most of the cases brought concerned alleged viola-
tions of specifi c treaty provisions, rather than of general principles of law.
Only on one occasion was a high- profi le po liti cal crisis brought to the
Court. Th is concerned a proposed arrangement, in 1931, by Germany and