394 Between Yesterday and Tomorrow (1914– )other assistance to the Allied side— turning the United States, in President
Roo se velt’s proud boast, into “the arsenal of democracy.”
Th e legal case for the “non- belligerency” policy was presented by Attor-
ney General Robert H. Jackson (soon to be appointed to the American
Supreme Court). In an address to the Inter- American Bar Association in
1941, he defended his government’s policy by invoking the Pact of Paris.
Germany’s violation of the pact, Jackson asserted, justifi ed the United
States in responding with a policy of “discriminating, qualifi ed neutrality” in
place of the traditional kind— eff ectively as a sanction against Germany for its
lawless conduct. In support of this argument, he invoked the Budapest Ar-
ticles of Interpretation. Jackson even maintained that the “non- belligerency”
policy actually marked “a return to earlier and more healthy precepts,” that
is, to the spirit of prepositivist just-war thought, which he also expressly
invoked.
Support for this “non- belligerency” policy was predictably fi rm from law-
yers in the liberal camp— with assistance for the Allied side substituted for
erstwhile support for the now- moribund League of Nations. Predictable, too,
was the role of Wright as the most eloquent spokesman. Th e very notion of a
“community of nations,” he insisted, militated against traditional neutrality
and impartiality in the present grave crisis. Opposition to the “non-
belligerency” policy, however, was vigorous. Borchard denounced it as a
straightforward violation of the law of neutrality, with its fundamental re-
quirements of abstention and impartiality.
Th e argument on this subject abruptly vanished in December 1941, when
the attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the con-
fl ict as a full participant in the war time alliance. Th at alliance was given the
offi cial name of “United Nations.” It was also decided— or at least hoped—
that the nations in the alliance would remain united aft er the guns were
silenced. Th e Allied states, under the ever- watchful leadership of the major
powers, would then proceed not merely to win a war but also to make a new
world in its wake. Th is second task proved, in many instructive ways, to be
at least as challenging as the fi rst.