434 Between Yesterday and Tomorrow (1914– )At the same time, though, there was some dissatisfaction in the newly in-
de pen dent countries, as there had been in the socialist states, over the fact
that international law was overwhelmingly a product of Western Eu rope
and its off shoots. Th at meant that joining the international community en-
tailed, as it were, “signing on” to a system that had been created by very dif-
ferent countries in very diff erent circumstances from those now prevailing.
In theory, it might have been possible for one or more of the new states to
“opt out” of this system entirely. But a moment’s thought revealed that to be
unfeasible. Such an isolated state would be an “outlaw” state in the true legal
sense. It would, presumably, have no legal status as a state, no right to UN
membership, no ability to send or receive ambassadors, and possibly no
protection from the UN Charter’s general prohibition against the use of
force. Th ere was, accordingly, no realistic alternative to accepting interna-
tional law as it stood at the time— though with the possibility of steering its
future development along lines preferred by the new states.
Over the years, the developing countries, frequently with the socialist
states as ready allies, attempted to alter the substantive rules of international
law, but not always successfully. One conspicuous failure was an attempt to
forge a “new international economic order” in the 1970s, based on two
broad principles. One was an ironclad respect for state sovereignty, to the
point of eff ectively allowing host countries unilaterally to decide on the
treatment of foreign investors (including the highly sensitive question of
compensation for nationalization of property). Th is amounted, in short, to
an assertion of the Calvo Doctrine. Th e other key principle was an “obliga-
tion” on the part of Western states to transfer signifi cant economic re-
sources to the developing world. A combination of indiff erence and hostility
by the developed countries, however, prevented this program from becom-
ing anything more than an aspiration.
In other respects, though, the developing countries were more success-
ful. Two of their initiatives were especially noteworthy. One was largely
symbolic and of less practical importance than had been anticipated. Th e
other, ironically, was soon seen to be in danger of being all too successful.
Th e fi rst was in the area of armed confl ict. Th e other was the development of
a new right of self- determination.