Shadows across the Path 473known as humanitarian intervention. Th is was a right— or alleged right— of
states to take armed action on their own initiative to protect foreign nation-
als from serious oppression by their governments. It resembles universal
jurisdiction, in that international law provides the content of the law— while
national governments supply the enforcement muscle. International law
supplies, as it were, the soft ware, and state governments the hardware. As in
the case of universal jurisdiction, no material connection between the inter-
vening state and the persons being rescued is thought necessary.
It has been observed that various fi gures in the solidarist camp had long
supported the existence of such a right. Solidarist writers were far from
united on the subject, though. Th omas Franck, for example, consistently
with his general consensus outlook, strongly contested the legality of hu-
manitarian intervention. Mainstream positivists were more united on the
question— in opposition. Given their scrupulous respect for the principle
of nonintervention, positivists might readily enough concede a moral case
for humanitarian intervention, but not a legal one.
Aft er 1945, there was additional legal support for the case against the le-
gality of humanitarian intervention, in the form of the UN Charter’s general
ban on the use of armed force. But there was also, at least arguably, greater
support in its favor as well, in the form of a generally higher concern for hu-
man rights. It was an excellent illustration of a painful confl ict between
values— support for oppressed peoples against vicious rulers versus the pro-
motion of world peace.
Th e lawfulness (or otherwise) of humanitarian intervention has been vig-
orously debated in academic circles for many years. It is probably safe to say
that it is the single most contested issue in the whole of international law. In
general, though, governments have been reluctant to invoke it as a justifi ca-
tion for their actions. When India intervened in the Pakistan civil war of
1970– 71, for example, its government refrained from giving humanitarian
intervention as a defense for its action. Th e same was true in 1979, when the
government of Tanzania used armed force to drive the tyrannical regime of
Idi Amin from power in Uganda. Th ere was, accordingly, a certain feeling
that, while humanitarian intervention might be a fascinating intellectual
conundrum, it was not a real presence on the world stage.
Th at complacent attitude changed abruptly in 1999, when humanitarian
intervention was explicitly invoked in the context of a crisis in Serbia. It