The Terrible Price of Freedom 215
plan to the tripartite powers. He had made his first broadcast on Feb-
ruary 19 from Berlin, but that was not where he wanted to be. He had
to go to Rangoon—the cap ital of Burma, soon to be freed by the Japa-
nese—and make it the base for Indian nationalist pro pa ganda and the
springboard for Indian nationalist action. His friends in the German
Foreign Office, including Adam von Trott, supported his efforts, and a
declaration in support of Indian freedom seemed on the anvil. The
draft declaration produced by the German Foreign Office on Febru-
ary 22 contained ev ery thing Bose could have asked for:
Germany, Italy and Japan are convinced that the Indian nation will
break the po lit i cal and economic bonds of British Imperialism and
then as master of its own fate will carry out a sweeping transformation
of its national life for the lasting bene fit of its own people and as con-
tribution to the welfare and the peace of the world. It is no concern of
the Tripartite Powers what form the Indian people, after their libera-
tion, will in future give to their interior po lit i cal or ga ni za tion. It is a
matter to be decided upon by the Indian people themselves and their
leaders what constitution is the most suitable for their country and
how it is to be put into practice. The Tripartite Powers are concerned to
end—on a basis of social justice—the misery and poverty of the Indian
people, and to see the exploited masses assisted to a proper standard of
living as well as to employment and prosperity.^34The lack of trust and coordination between Japan and Germany en-
sured that the moment was lost. The presence of someone of Bose’s
stature on its soil gave Germany a le ver not just in relation to Britain,
but also in its negotiations with Japan.
The Japanese had launched their war without caring to inform ei-
ther their enemies or their allies, and did not intend to follow German
directives in matters to do with Asia. Japan wanted Germany to give up
its obsession with the Soviet Union and instead concentrate its military
might on the British in the Suez. The naval commands of both Japan
and Germany wished to establish a link across the Indian Ocean. If this
could be done, “the war would be practically won and the British Em-
pire would be fin ished.” This breakthrough, according to the naval