The Terrible Price of Freedom 225was a global struggle. In June 1942 he had sent a message to a confer-
ence in Bangkok stressing the need “to link up Indian nationalists all
over the world in one all- embracing or ga ni za tion.” During the August
crisis, he yearned to be close to the eastern borders of India—but de-
spite his best efforts, he had been trapped in Europe since February.
The radio was the only weapon Bose could use to fight alongside his
compa tri ots at home. Azad Hind Radio had been broadcasting since
October 1941; and from February 1942 onward, Bose himself was the
leading voice calling for a free India. Every day, broadcasts lasting 230
minutes were transmitted in En glish and seven South Asian languages:
Hindustani (a blend of Hindi and Urdu), Bengali, Tamil, Telegu, Gu-
jarati, Persian, and Pushtu. A powerful Philips transmitter at Huizen,
in the Netherlands, was used to beam the broadcasts to India, where
there were an estimated 120,000 radio sets and where listening to the
voice of Azad Hind became a favorite clandestine activity. During the
visit of Stafford Cripps, a second broadcasting ser vice—called National
Congress Radio—was established, to align the movements within and
without to a common purpose. Once the Quit India movement began
in earnest, a third ser vice—Azad Muslim Radio—hit the airwaves, urg-
ing the Muslims of India to join the struggle for in de pen dence. Tal-
ented scriptwriters and speakers in Urdu, Habibur Rahman and A. M.
Sultan, were put in charge of broadcasts on this channel.
The concern about Hindu- Muslim unity animated Bose’s efforts as
he went about the task of recruiting soldiers for the Indian Legion.
Even though he wanted to be in Asia, he did not let up on his endeavor
to wean Indian soldiers in European prisoner- of- war camps from their
loyalty to the British. From a modest beginning in December 1941, the
Indian Legion grew to four battalions by December 1942. At his very
first encounter with Indian soldiers, in the German POW camp at An-
naberg, some noncommissioned of fi cers had tried to disrupt the re-
cruitment pro cess. Deeming fully committed recruits to be preferable
to vacillating ones, Bose relied entirely on his powers of persuasion in
the battle for the hearts and minds of soldiers who had once served the
British king- emperor. “In his long dark robe,” N. G. Ganpuley has ob-
served, “he looked more like a priest preaching his sermon than a mili-
tary leader addressing soldiers.”^55 Girija Mookerjee has described a rally