258 HIS MAJESTY’S OPPONENT
tions in 1943. Both were talking about shedding Indian blood, rather
than spilling the blood of their enemies.
Secular nationalism in the late colonial era had slid rather easily into
forms of religious or ethnic majoritarianism. When it came to bridging
differences, rights- based discourses on secular uniformity generally
failed, whereas discourses focusing on blood sac ri fice and blood broth-
erhood did not. Perhaps Bose’s success was easier to achieve in an over-
seas context, where there was less obsession with land than in territo-
rial nationalisms, despite references to the sacred soil of India. There
were both territorial and extraterritorial features in the INA’s anticolo-
nialism. Bose was extraordinarily effective in forging Hindu- Muslim
unity at a time when divisions along lines of religion were looming
large within India. He blazed an innovative path to a cosmopolitan
anticolonialism among expatriate pa tri ots by nurturing a pro cess of
cultural intimacy among India’s diverse communities. His strategy en-
tailed combating religious prejudice without stumbling into the secu-
larists’ pitfall of making religion the enemy of the nation.
Just after midnight on October 23–24, 1943, the Provisional Govern-
ment of Free India declared war on Britain and the United States of
America. The decision to include the United States as an enemy was
not uncontested. At a cabinet meeting on the evening of October 23,
A. D. Loganathan asked: “Why drag in America, sir?” He had a point.
Since Indians had no particular quarrel with the United States, there
was something to be said for retaining American goodwill for the fu-
ture. Bose argued that the presence of American forces on Indian soil
was a “grim reality” that would make the INA’s task of defeating the
British “doubly dif fi cult.” The United States should have put pressure
on Britain to accede to India’s demand for in de pen dence immediately.
Since the INA would have to fight against British and American troops
on Indian soil, he wanted to include the United States in his govern-
ment’s declaration of war.^44 If he had not insisted on this course, his
appeals to the American public the following year to support the cause
of India’s freedom might have carried more weight.
Nine states of the Axis and pro- Axis powers, including Japan and
Germany, gave international diplomatic recognition to the Indian Pro-
visional Government. A message of personal congratulations arrived