Roads to Delhi 273million rupees—roughly $60.6 million—from Malaya and Burma.^67 A
cabinet reshuffle helped in this regard. Once Chatterji became chief
administrator of the liberated territories, Bose appointed N. Raghavan
as his fi nance minister. Raghavan connected better with the wealthy
south Indian communities in Malaya and Burma, and ensured a steady
flow of resources into the government’s coffers. Nambiar, in Europe,
was made a member of the cabinet, and the Indian Legion there was
declared to be a branch of the INA. G. R. Nagar and Habibur Rahman
became the new military representatives in Bose’s government. Attavar
Yellappa and Ishar Singh were promoted from advisers to ministers,
and S. M. Bashir of Rangoon was brought in as an adviser. S. C. Ala-
gappan was given the portfolio of supplies, since that was likely to be of
critical importance as the campaign pro gressed. By early April 1944,
the Azad Hind government was issuing postage stamps for use in the
liberated zones, and was printing sample currency notes.^68 If anything,
Bose’s plans for postwar reconstruction in India had run ahead of suc-
cessful implementation of a war strategy.
On April 7, with the Imphal offensive well under way, Bose moved a
small advance headquarters north, from Rangoon to Maymyo, a small
hill town near Mandalay. The Japanese general Mutaguchi was based
there. It seemed like a good place to get news from the front and estab-
lish a base, which would permit a rapid move to Imphal to take charge
of the administration. During an earlier conference on strategy, Bose
had urged Mutaguchi to avoid cutting the Imphal- Kohima road and to
leave a route open for the British to retreat. He reckoned that once the
British were forced back from Imphal, the plains of Assam and Bengal
would be open to his forces. The next line of defense for the British
would be the Chhota Nagpur plateau, after his triumphant entry into
Calcutta by the autumn of that year. A consequence of the fall of Im-
phal might well be “a revolt in Bengal and Bihar against British rule in
India on a far larger scale” than the Quit India movement in 1942.^69
The British kept a tight lid on news regarding the Indian National
Army within India, while denouncing Bose as a traitor in broadcasts
from London. The threat to northeast India and, by extension, to the
strategic road linking China led American journalists to offer their as-
sessment of Bose and his army. On March 11, 1944, The Saturday Eve-