International Conflicts, 1816-2010. Militarized Interstate Dispute Narratives - Douglas M. Gibler

(Marcin) #1

Europe 263


Outcome (and Settlement): Yield by side B (Negotiated)
Fatalities: None
Narrative: This dispute concerns German demands over the Sudetenland that culmi-
nated in the Munich Agreement. The Sudetenland was created in the wake of World
War I. Administered by the Czechs, the area had important German segments. This
naturally made Sudetenland a target for Nazi Germany’s Heim ins Reich policy. In
light of the German annexation of Austria (MID#11) and the Czech’s alliance with
the Soviet Union and France, the demands instantly became a regional affair.
The problem here lay fundamentally in Britain and France’s inability to commit
to Czechoslovakia. France, officially allied with Czechoslovakia, had no functional
ability to support Czechoslovakia. Britain was not even allied with the Czechs. There
was real incentive for France to fan the flames of crisis to pass the buck to the British.
There was also incentive by the Soviets to pass the buck to the French, indicating sup-
port of Czechoslovakia contingent on a first move by the French. Hitler had overstated
the commitment of Britain, France, and the Soviet Union to preserving the status quo.
All wished to make this issue go away as soon as possible.
The German government and sympathetic Germans in the Sudetenland fanned
the flames of crisis. On March 28, 1938, Hitler met with the leader of the Sudeten
Germans, Konrad Heinlein, telling him to give a list of demands to the Czech govern-
ment so untenable that it would prompt some kind of reaction. These were delivered
on April 24, with Henlein demanding Czechoslovakia be dissolved into a state of
nationalities with rights for the Nazi party. The British and French, anxious to make
the issue go away, pressured the Czechs to pacify the issue, underscoring the inability
of both states to commit to a sound policy on the Czechoslovakian front. The Czechs
mobilized and prepared for an expected surprise attack from Germany (which was not
coming, nor planned) on May 20. This made the British and French panic even more.
The prospect of war unnerved both states to the point where France warned that unrea-
sonable behavior on the end of the Czechs would free France from their alliance bonds.
Meanwhile, Britain became more sympathetic with the increasing demands made by
the Germans. Ten days later (May 30), an insulted Hitler vowed to make the annihilation
of Czechoslovakia official policy. He later conditioned this statement on the prospect of
French intervention. A frustrated Britain, anxious that Germany might act, dispatched Lord
Runciman to Prague on July 26, giving him the impossible task of mediating the issue
between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans. Unable to reach an agreement through the
summer, Runciman wrote back that he concluded the transfer of the territories to Germany
would be recommended. This sets up how this crisis was ultimately concluded.
Hitler gave an impassioned speech in Nuremberg on September 12, detailing Czech
grievances against the Sudeten Germans. The next day, the Sudeten separatists ended
all talks with the Czech government leadership. An open revolt seemed imminent.
Neville Chamberlain flew to Munich on September 15 to meet with Hitler. He came
back convinced that settling German national/territorial issues that grew out of Ver-
sailles would make Hitler pacific. After an Anglo-French meeting shortly thereafter,
both France and Britain concluded that Czechoslovakia needed to be coerced. On
September 21, the British and French gave Czechoslovakia an ultimatum (with Soviet
blessing): agree to the loss of Sudetenland or forfeit the alliance commitments. Czech
President Benes protested loudly, but ultimately capitulated. The British called for a
conference in Munich on September 28. This became the Munich Agreement.
Coding changes: End Date changed from September 30, 1938.

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