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3 Different Relations to Insularity
Ironically, Sicily drew strength from its insular situation by going on the of-
fensive. The Aghlabid and Kalbite Muslims of Palermo had a naval shipyard at
their disposal, which joined with the maritime forces of the Maghrebian fleet
to carry out successful expeditions on Terrafirma, in Dalmatia, in the Ionian
Islands, in the upper Tyrrhenian Sea (against Genoa, sacked in 934), and fi-
nally against Ummayad al-Andalus. Thus, the insulation sought by the Sicilian
Muslims was achieved through absolute, long-range superiority at sea.
However, this was to lead to failure for the Sicilian Muslims who lacked
the land forces to secure their claims. On the other hand, the land forces of
the Normans, with the support of their advanced fleets, were able to estab-
lish a single territorial dominion over the two banks of the Strait of Messina.
There they subsequently set up a state capable of seeking to expand to either
end of the narrow Italian peninsula, from the Strait of Messina to the Strait of
Otranto.11 At the outset, the Normans limited their dominance over the seas to
the area extending from Cap Bon to Tripoli. They also set off on ambitious sea-
faring expeditions, to Almería and the Balearic Islands in 1128. Subsequently,
under George of Antioch’s command, a series of naval conquests enabled them
to establish a chain of ports along the African coast, which were occupied and
provisioned from Sicily: the skeleton of an “Arab kingdom” with Mahdiyya at
its center.12 The Normans undertook similar projects along the Balkan and
Hellenic coasts of the Adriatic and the Ionian Seas, including the occupation
of Corfu under the protectorate of Ragusa, but an early crisis in the monarchy
put an end to all these ambitions.
In the twelfth century, Sicily was the only large state in the Western
Mediterranean to have its own naval shipyards (Messina, Mascali, Palermo),
which were maintained at great expense, as well as a fleet of galleys along
11 First, under Roger I and young Roger II, on a “mahanian” scheme: huge strategic fleets and
decisive battles; see Alfred Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston,
1918 [first edition 1889]); then, under Giorgio d’Antiochia, on a “castexian” one: occupa-
tion of the opposite coasts and main ports of Dalmazia, Albania, Ionian islands, Libya,
and Tunisia, a scheme which would be the strategic principle of the Sicilian governments
until Charles V; cf. Raoul Castex, Mélanges stratégiques (Paris, 1976); and Hervé Coutau-
Bégarié, La Puissance maritime. Castex et la stratégie navale (Paris, 1985); Henri Bresc, “Du
ribât au presidio, les enjeux et les contrôles des Détroits siciliens,” in Controllo degli Stretti
e insediamenti militari nel Mediterraneo (Rome, 2002), pp. 97–127.
12 Henri Bresc., “Le royaume Normand d’Afrique et l’archevêché de Mahdiyya,” in Le Partage
du monde. Échanges et colonisation dans la Méditerranée médiévale, eds Michel Balard
and Alain Ducellier (Paris, 1998), pp. 347–366.