Spanish Sardinia: Conflicts And Alliances 255
immune to these attacks, as raiders consequently sacked villages and captured
inhabitants, who would later be sold as slaves to eastern merchants or assigned
to the galleys.
The territorial disputes indiscriminately engaged in by Christian and Muslim
countries did not subside even with the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis of April
1559, which put an end to the Franco-Hispanic conflict. Nor did it end with
Genoa’s re-assumption of control over Corsica, the center of commercial traf-
fic within the inner Mediterranean, which Braudel called the “sea of boats” due
to its lively commerce.7 Despite the abundance of tuna, coral, and every sort of
fish, the lack of galleys and an adequate system of coastal defense made fishing
in the high seas difficult and very risky. “The fortune in the sea” was exploited
only by those with the means to defend themselves. The military emergency
of the sixteenth century weighed more heavily on the economic development
and community in Sardinia than has hitherto been acknowledged. The eco-
nomic distress of the island was partly the result of constant pressure from the
Turks and pirates who attacked ship traffic.
Although Islamo-Turkish pressure in the Mediterranean eased after the
Christian victory at Lepanto,8 incursions into the kingdoms of Spain’s domin-
ion continued. Even the city of Cagliari, the seat of both the viceroy’s govern-
ment and the most prestigious civil and religious institutions, was attacked
and sacked by pirates in 1582. This close call alerted the island to the inadequa-
cy of its defense system and of the urgent need to batten down the hatches.
In 1583, as the Viceroy Miguel de Moncada begged for urgent provisions from
the Spanish Crown to upgrade the island’s defense system, he noted that the
kingdom of Sardinia had found itself on the front lines: the frontera de Tunes y
Biserta, y de toda la Berberia. Guaranteeing the monarchy’s financial commit-
ment to fortifying the kingdom’s defense system, Philip II himself described
the island as “the frons et propugnaculum [...] Africae provincia et Saracenis.”
For over a decade, the defense of Sardinia was a source of apprehension
and Madrid redoubled its attention to the problem. However, the island’s pro-
jection into the military scheme of the Mediterranean posed a problem with
no easy solution for local government authorities due to the indisputable gap
between the island’s modest economic and demographic resources and the
Moderna: Convegno internazionale di studi, Villasimius-Baunei, 20–24 settembre 2005, 3 vols
(Cagliari, 2008); see especially, Giovanni Murgia, “Presenza corsara nel mediterraneo occi-
dentale e problemi di difesa del Regno di Sardegna (secoli XVI–XVII),” vol. 1, pp. 155–195.
7 Fernand Braudel, Civiltà e imperi del Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo II (Turin, 1986) vol. 1,
pp. 145–151.
8 Niccolò Capponi, Lepanto 1571. La Lega Santa contro l’Impero ottomano (Milan, 2006).