the venetian economy 259
vessels provided efficient services between the various Levantine cities,
just as the English and Dutch were to do later.
Tensions between the two greatest Italian naval powers led to numer-
ous clashes and conflicts, culminating in the war of Chioggia (1378–81),
which saw Genoa penetrate the Venetian lagoon and seriously threaten
Venetian survival. However, the Serenissima was able to avoid total ruin
and eventually reacquired military supremacy over its rival. It is plausible
that the shifting of Genoese interests from the eastern Mediterranean
towards western markets was in part caused by the constant pressure
exerted by the Venetians, in addition to the recurrent Mongol and Otto-
man threats. From the 13th century, unlike Genoa, Venice constructed an
almost continuous chain of fortifications from the northern Adriatic to
the Aegean in order to offer permanent protection to ships leaving the
city of St Mark.4 Starting in the mid-14th century, the government orga-
nized a system of convoys (the so-called mude) composed of armed ves-
sels (the galee grosse) built in the Arsenale and thus property of the state,
and then farmed them out to merchants. The most precious goods were
transported on these convoys at rather high costs, but with very low insur-
ance rates.5 Starting in the mid-15th century, Venetian merchants were
able to achieve a preeminent position in the most important Levantine
ports and thus dominate their other Italian competitors.6
Naturally, the advantages of a partial monopoly on the spice trade were
considerable. It has been estimated that profits deriving from overseas
trade reached 40 per cent and were at times even higher.7 That said, it
is still plausible to argue that a merchant’s net profit was in the range
of 10–20 per cent. If such ample profit margins attracted investors from
different groups within the Venetian population, which might participate
in these overseas enterprises even with small sums of money, for the gov-
ernment, long-distance commerce constituted the principal source of fis-
cal revenues. Customs dues and the taxation on trade and consumption
contributed a huge part of government income and made Venice one of
the great powers of medieval Europe.
4 John Dotson, “Venice, Genoa and Control of the Seas in the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Centuries,” in John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds., War and Sea in the
Middle Ages and the Renaissance (Woodbridge, 2003), p. 135.
5 Frederic C. Lane, Navires et constructeurs à Venise pendant la Renaissance (Paris,
1965), pp. 22–23.
6 Eliyahu Ashtor, “The Venetian Supremacy in Levantine Trade: Monopoly or Pre-
Colonialism?” Journal of European Economic History 3 (1974), 5–53.
7 Eliyahu Ashtor, “Profits from Trade with the Levant in the Fifteenth Century,” Bulletin
of the School of Oriental and African Studies 37 (1975), 268.