Kontors and Outposts 129
To maintain the impression of uniformity within an organization, it was
important to ensure that all Hanseatic merchants acted in accordance with
the privileges. Violations of the rules, even by a few merchants, could result
in decreased trust by the authorities and possibly the cancellation of impor-
tant privileges. One main purposes of establishing kontors was to control the
economic and social activities of the merchants as effectively as possible. The
more control a merchant was exposed to, the lower the risk of him violating
the rules. This is why most kontors were geographically closed entities, so that
there was little chance that one of the merchants could do business without the
knowledge of at least one other Hansard. Even in the case of Bruges, where
the Hanseatic kontor did not have a geographical area under its jurisdiction,
measures were taken to ensure mutual control.
The internal control, unity, and strength of the hanseatic towns satisfied
two important reasons to establish and support kontors abroad. However,
there were other advantages connected to them as well. One of these points is
the security of the merchants’ goods and life. As mentioned, being a stranger
in a medieval town involved certain risks, and being a wealthy stranger might
not always have reduced these risks. As a result, the merchants might have
felt a need for mutual protection. Thus, an organized group of some hundred
Hanseatic merchants, represented by spokesmen and clearly possessing eco-
nomic strength and power, probably did reduce the urge of local denizens or
other rivals to attack the merchants or take their goods by force. It also gave
much more weight to complaints and demands on the rulers or the local
authorities.
The kontors also reduced intra-Hanseatic competition. Since the home-
towns relied on a wealthy and successful merchant class, and that merchant
class made up the backbone of the town councils, the townspeople were inter-
ested in the economic success of as many of their merchants as possible. In all
kontor regulations, we find measures with the objective to guarantee at least a
certain level of equal competition conditions. For example, within the statutes
of the kontors, one could find prohibitions to handle other Hansards’ denizen
trading partners or paragraphs regarding the maximum amount of goods a
single merchant was allowed to sell. These regulations were to prevent heavy
losses caused by internal intrigues or an artificial over-supply of special goods
in a certain market. Thus, trade at the kontors ensured that most of the mer-
chants made at least a modest profit. However, the rules were flexible enough
not to set upper limits on the merchants’ profits.
Last, but not least, I want to mention the social security that was provided
by the kontor. In all four trading posts, the Hanseatic merchants were far from